



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS  
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August 6, 2004

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OR2004-6648

Dear Ms. Constantine:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 206680.

The Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Board (the "board") received two requests for the proposals submitted for Contract No. 8001894. The first requestor seeks all proposals submitted for the contract. The second requestor seeks the proposals submitted by Burson-Marsteller LLC ("Burson-Marsteller") and Weber Shandwick Worldwide ("Weber"). You state that the board is in the process of releasing some responsive information. As for the submitted information, although you make no arguments and take no position as to whether it is excepted from disclosure, pursuant to section 552.305 of the Government Code, you notified interested third parties GCI Read-Poland ("GCI"), The Harrell Group ("Harrell"), Weber, and Burson-Marsteller of the request and of their opportunity to submit comments to this office. *See Gov't Code* § 552.305 (permitting interested third party to submit to attorney general reasons why requested information should not be released); Open Records Decision No. 542 (1990) (determining that statutory predecessor to section 552.305 permits governmental body to rely on interested third party to raise and explain applicability of exception to disclosure in certain circumstances). In correspondence with this office, Harrell and Burson-Marsteller assert that their submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.110 of the Government Code. You have forwarded to this office correspondence from Weber and GCI in which each entity objects to the release of certain information. We will also treat this correspondence as a response under section 552.305 of the Government Code. *See Gov't Code* § 552.305. We have considered all submitted arguments and reviewed the submitted information.

We first address Harrell's argument that they object to the release of the submitted information because it was marked "Proprietary and Confidential." GCI also states that they had a "reasonable assumption . . . that the information submitted would be held as confidential." Information is not confidential under the Public Information Act (the "Act") simply because the party submitting the information anticipates or requests that it be kept confidential. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex. 1976). In other words, a governmental body cannot, through an agreement or contract, overrule or repeal provisions of the Act. Attorney General Opinion JM-672 (1987); Open Records Decision Nos. 541 at 3 (1990) ("[T]he obligations of a governmental body under [the predecessor to the Act] cannot be compromised simply by its decision to enter into a contract."), 203 at 1 (1978) (mere expectation of confidentiality by person supplying information does not satisfy requirements of statutory predecessor to section 552.110). Consequently, unless the information at issue falls within an exception to disclosure, it must be released, notwithstanding any agreement or statement specifying otherwise.

Next, we address Burson-Marstellar's privacy argument. Burson-Marstellar argues that the release of information regarding its employee team staff and management would "constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[.]" Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. This section encompasses the doctrines of common-law and constitutional privacy. Common-law privacy protects information if it (1) contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate public concern. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). The type of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation* included information relating to sexual assault, pregnancy, mental or physical abuse in the workplace, illegitimate children, psychiatric treatment of mental disorders, attempted suicide, and injuries to sexual organs. *Id.* at 683.

Constitutional privacy consists of two interrelated types of privacy: (1) the right to make certain kinds of decisions independently and (2) an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Open Records Decision No. 455 at 4 (1987). The first type protects an individual's autonomy within "zones of privacy" which include matters related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. *Id.* The second type of constitutional privacy requires a balancing between the individual's privacy interests and the public's need to know information of public concern. *Id.* The scope of information protected is narrower than that under the common-law doctrine of privacy; the information must concern the "most intimate aspects of human affairs." *Id.* at 5 (citing *Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Texas*, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985)).

This office has found that the following types of information are excepted from required public disclosure under constitutional or common law privacy: some kinds of medical information or information indicating disabilities or specific illnesses, *see* Open Records Decision Nos. 470 (1987) (illness from severe emotional and job-related stress), 455 (1987) (prescription drugs, illnesses, operations, and physical handicaps); personal financial

information not relating to the financial transaction between an individual and a governmental body, *see* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 (1992), 545 (1990); information concerning the intimate relations between individuals and their family members, *see* Open Records Decision No. 470 (1987); and identities of victims of sexual abuse, *see* Open Records Decision Nos. 440 (1986), 393 (1983), 339 (1982).

We have reviewed the submitted documents and conclude that none of this information is protected by common-law or constitutional privacy. We further note that common-law privacy protects the interests of individuals, not those of corporations and other types of business organizations. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 620 (1993) (corporation has no right to privacy), 192 (1978) (right to privacy is designed primarily to protect human feelings and sensibilities, rather than property, business, or other pecuniary interests); *see also* *U. S. v. Morton Salt Co.*, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (cited in *Rosen v. Matthews Constr. Co.*, 777 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), *rev'd on other grounds*, 796 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1990)) (corporation has no right to privacy). Accordingly, none of the submitted information may be withheld under section 552.101 based on privacy interests.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses information protected by other statutes. Burson-Marsteller raises the federal Trade Secrets Act, which provides in pertinent part:

[w]hoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, any person acting on behalf of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, or agent of the Department of Justice as defined in the Antitrust Civil Process Act, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.

18 U.S.C. § 1905. By its terms, this statute pertains only to employees and agents of the federal government. State employees who are assigned to federal government agencies in some circumstances may be deemed federal employees for certain purposes. 5 U.S.C. § 3374. However, in this case there is no indication of such an assignment pertinent to the responsive information. The federal courts have held that no basis exists to justify transforming officers and employees of state agencies into federal officers and employees for purposes of the Trade Secrets Act. *St. Michael's Convalescent Hospital v. State of Cal.*, 643

F.2d 1369 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981). We conclude that the Trade Secrets Act does not prohibit the board from disclosing the responsive information. Therefore, the subject information is not excepted from public disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the Trade Secrets Act.

We now address the third parties' arguments relative to section 552.110 of the Government Code. Section 552.110 protects the property interests of private persons by excepting from disclosure two types of information: (1) trade secrets obtained from a person and privileged or confidential by statute or judicial decision and (2) commercial or financial information for which it is demonstrated based on specific factual evidence that disclosure would cause substantial competitive harm to the person from whom the information was obtained. *See* Gov't Code § 552.110(a), (b).

The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the definition of trade secret from section 757 of the Restatement of Torts. *Hyde Corp. v. Huffines*, 314 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.); *see also* Open Records Decision No. 552 at 2 (1990). Section 757 provides that a trade secret is

any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. It differs from other secret information in a business . . . in that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business . . . . A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business . . . . [It may] relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a code for determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of specialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office management.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). In determining whether particular information constitutes a trade secret, this office considers the Restatement's definition of trade secret as well as the Restatement's list of six trade secret factors.<sup>1</sup> *Id.* This office has held that if a

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<sup>1</sup>The Restatement of Torts lists the following six factors as indicia of whether information constitutes a trade secret:

- (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the company];
- (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and other involved in [the company's] business;
- (3) the extent of measures taken by [the company] to guard the secrecy of the information;
- (4) the value of the information to [the company] and [its] competitors;
- (5) the amount of effort or money expended by [the company] in developing the information;
- (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); *see also* Open Records Decision Nos. 319 at 2 (1982), 306 at 2 (1982), 255 at 2 (1980).

governmental body takes no position with regard to the application of the trade secret branch of section 552.110 to requested information, we must accept a private person's claim for exception as valid under that branch if that person establishes a *prima facie* case for exception and no argument is submitted that rebuts the claim as a matter of law. Open Records Decision No. 552 at 5-6 (1990). However, we cannot conclude that section 552.110(a) applies unless it has been shown that the information meets the definition of a trade secret and the necessary factors have been demonstrated to establish a trade secret claim. See Open Records Decision No. 402 (1983).

Section 552.110(b) of the Government Code exempts from disclosure “[c]ommercial or financial information for which it is demonstrated based on specific factual evidence that disclosure would cause substantial competitive harm to the person from whom the information was obtained[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.110(b). Section 552.110(b) requires a specific factual or evidentiary showing, not conclusory or generalized allegations, that substantial competitive injury would likely result from release of the information at issue. See Open Records Decision No. 661 at 5-6 (1999) (stating that business enterprise must show by specific factual evidence that release of information would cause it substantial competitive harm); see also *National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton*, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

Having reviewed the submitted briefs, we find that Burson-Marsteller and Weber have each made a *prima facie* case that its client information constitutes a trade secret. Accordingly, the board must withhold the information in Burson-Marsteller’s and Weber’s responses that we have marked under section 552.110. However, we otherwise conclude that Burson-Marsteller and Weber have failed to make a *prima facie* case that any of their remaining information constitutes a trade secret. Likewise, Harrell and GCI have failed to make a *prima facie* case that any of their information constitutes a trade secret. Further, we find that Burson-Marsteller, Harrell, Weber, and GCI have made only conclusory allegations and have made no specific factual or evidentiary showing that release of their information would likely cause them substantial competitive harm. See Open Records Decision Nos. 509 at 5 (1988) (because costs, bid specifications, and circumstances would change for future contracts, assertion that release of bid proposal might give competitor unfair advantage on future contracts was entirely too speculative), 319 at 3 (1982) (information relating to organization and personnel, market studies, professional references, qualifications and experience, and pricing are not ordinarily excepted from disclosure under statutory predecessor); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (information is generally not trade secret if it is “simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business” rather than “a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business”). Accordingly, the board may not withhold any of the remaining information related to Burson-Marsteller or Weber, or any portion of Harrell’s or GCI’s information, under section 552.110 of the Government Code.

We note that the remaining submitted information contains insurance policy numbers that are subject to section 552.136 of the Government Code. Section 552.136 provides in relevant part:

(a) In this section, "access device" means a card, plate, code, account number, personal identification number, electronic serial number, mobile identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier or means of account access that alone or in conjunction with another access device may be used to:

(1) obtain money, goods, services, or another thing of value; or

(2) initiate a transfer of funds other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a credit card, debit card, charge card, or access device number that is collected, assembled, or maintained by or for a governmental body is confidential.

Gov't Code § 552.136. The marked insurance policy numbers must be withheld under section 552.136.

We also note that the remaining submitted information contains a social security number. Social security numbers may be withheld in some circumstances under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the 1990 amendments to the federal Social Security Act, section 405(c)(2)(C)(viii)(I) of title 42 of the United States Code. *See* Open Records Decision No. 622 (1994). These amendments make confidential social security numbers and related records that are obtained or maintained by a state agency or political subdivision of the state pursuant to any provision of law enacted on or after October 1, 1990. *See id.* We have no basis for concluding that the submitted social security number is confidential under section 405(c)(2)(C)(viii)(I) and therefore excepted from public disclosure under section 552.101 on the basis of that federal provision. We caution, however, that section 552.352 of the Government Code imposes criminal penalties for the release of confidential information. Prior to releasing any social security number, you should ensure that no such information was obtained or is maintained by the board pursuant to any provision of law enacted on or after October 1, 1990.

Finally, we note that some of the submitted information appears to be protected by copyright. A custodian of public records must comply with the copyright law and is not required to furnish copies of records that are copyrighted. Attorney General Opinion JM-672 (1987). A governmental body must allow inspection of copyrighted materials unless an exception applies to the information. *Id.* If a member of the public wishes to make copies of copyrighted materials, the person must do so unassisted by the governmental body. In making copies, the member of the public assumes the duty of compliance with the copyright law and the risk of a copyright infringement suit. *See* Open Records Decision No. 550 (1990).

In summary, the board must withhold the information we have marked related to Burson-Marstellar and Weber under section 552.110 of the Government Code. The board must also withhold the marked insurance policy numbers under section 552.136 of the Government Code. A social security number may be confidential under federal law. The remaining requested information must be released in accordance with applicable copyright laws for any information protected by copyright.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular records at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other records or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For example, governmental bodies are prohibited from asking the attorney general to reconsider this ruling. Gov't Code § 552.301(f). If the governmental body wants to challenge this ruling, the governmental body must appeal by filing suit in Travis County within 30 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.324(b). In order to get the full benefit of such an appeal, the governmental body must file suit within 10 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.353(b)(3), (c). If the governmental body does not appeal this ruling and the governmental body does not comply with it, then both the requestor and the attorney general have the right to file suit against the governmental body to enforce this ruling. *Id.* § 552.321(a).

If this ruling requires the governmental body to release all or part of the requested information, the governmental body is responsible for taking the next step. Based on the statute, the attorney general expects that, within 10 calendar days of this ruling, the governmental body will do one of the following three things: 1) release the public records; 2) notify the requestor of the exact day, time, and place that copies of the records will be provided or that the records can be inspected; or 3) notify the requestor of the governmental body's intent to challenge this letter ruling in court. If the governmental body fails to do one of these three things within 10 calendar days of this ruling, then the requestor should report that failure to the attorney general's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. The requestor may also file a complaint with the district or county attorney. *Id.* § 552.3215(e).

If this ruling requires or permits the governmental body to withhold all or some of the requested information, the requestor can appeal that decision by suing the governmental body. *Id.* § 552.321(a); *Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ).

Please remember that under the Act the release of information triggers certain procedures for costs and charges to the requestor. If records are released in compliance with this ruling, be sure that all charges for the information are at or below the legal amounts. Questions or complaints about over-charging must be directed to Hadassah Schloss at the Texas Building and Procurement Commission at (512) 475-2497.

If the governmental body, the requestor, or any other person has questions or comments about this ruling, they may contact our office. We note that a third party may challenge this ruling by filing suit seeking to withhold information from a requestor. Gov't Code § 552.325. Although there is no statutory deadline for contacting us, the attorney general prefers to receive any comments within 10 calendar days of the date of this ruling.

Sincerely,



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SIS/sdk

Ref: ID# 206680

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