



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

GREG ABBOTT

October 28, 2008

Mr. Samuel D. Hawk  
Assistant City Attorney  
Criminal Law and Police Division  
City of Dallas  
1400 South Lamar  
Dallas, Texas 75215

OR2008-14654

Dear Mr. Hawk:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 326155.

The Dallas Police Department (the "department") received a request for information relating to two specified incidents involving deceased individuals. You claim that some of the requested information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.108 of the Government Code. We have considered the exception you claim and have reviewed the information you submitted.

We first note, and you acknowledge, that the department did not request this decision within the ten-business-day period prescribed by section 552.301(b) of the Government Code.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the submitted information is presumed to be public under section 552.302 of the Government Code and must be released, unless there is a compelling reason to withhold any of the information. *See id.* § 552.302; *Hancock v. State Bd. of Ins.*, 797 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ). This statutory presumption can generally be overcome when information is confidential by law or third-party interests are at stake. *See Open*

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<sup>1</sup>You inform us that the department received this request for information on August 11, 2008; therefore, the department's ten-business-day deadline was August 25. You requested this decision on August 26.

Records Decision Nos. 630 at 3 (1994), 325 at 2 (1982). You claim section 552.108 of the Government Code, which is a discretionary exception to disclosure that protects a governmental body's interests and may be waived. *See* Gov't Code § 552.007; Open Records Decision Nos. 665 at 2 n.5 (2000) (discretionary exceptions generally), 663 at 5 (1999) (waiver of discretionary exceptions), 177 at 3 (1977) (statutory predecessor to Gov't Code § 552.108 subject to waiver). However, the interests under section 552.108 of a governmental body other than the one that failed to comply with section 552.301 can provide a compelling reason for non-disclosure under section 552.302. *See* Open Records Decision No. 586 at 2-3 (1991). You state that the Dallas County District Attorney's Office (the "district attorney") asserts an interest in the information at issue. Therefore, we will determine whether the department may withhold that information under section 552.108 on behalf of the district attorney.

Section 552.108 excepts from disclosure "[i]nformation held by a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that deals with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime . . . if . . . release of the information would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime[.]" Gov't Code § 552.108(a)(1). A governmental body must reasonably explain how and why section 552.108 is applicable to the information at issue. *See id.* § 552.301(e)(1)(A); *Ex parte Pruitt*, 551 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977). You have marked the information that the department seeks to withhold. You inform us that the marked information is related to a pending criminal investigation. You state that the district attorney has indicated to the department that the release of this information would interfere with the district attorney's ability to prosecute the case. Based on your representations, we find that the release of the marked information would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime. We therefore conclude that section 552.108(a)(1) is applicable in this instance. *See Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. City of Houston*, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975), *writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam*, 536 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1976) (court delineates law enforcement interests that are present in active cases).

We note, however, that the requestor has a potential right of access to the submitted information under federal law. Such a right of access, if applicable, would preempt the protection afforded by section 552.108 of the Government Code. *See* U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); *Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Black*, 116 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. 2003) (discussing federal preemption of state law). In this instance, the requestor is a representative of Advocacy, Inc. ("Advocacy"), which has been designated as the state's protection and advocacy system ("P&A system") for purposes of the federal Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act ("PAIMI Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act ("DDA Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act ("PAIR Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794e. *See* Tex. Gov. Exec. Order No. DB-33, 2 Tex. Reg. 3713 (1977); Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 (2002); *see also* 42 CFR §§ 51.2 (defining "designated official" and requiring official to designate agency to be accountable for funds

of P&A agency), 51.22 (requiring P&A agency to have a governing authority responsible for control).

The PAIMI Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system “shall . . . have access to all records of . . . any individual who is a client of the system if such individual . . . has authorized the system to have such access[.]” 42 U.S.C § 10805(a)(4)(A). The term “records” as used in the above-quoted provision

includes reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment [to the individual] or reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning records.

*Id.* § 10806(b)(3)(A). The DDA Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system shall

(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred;

...

(I) have access to all records of—

(I) any individual with a developmental disability who is a client of the system if such individual, or the legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative of such individual, has authorized the system to have such access[.]

(J)

(I) have access to the records of individuals described in subparagraphs (B) and (I), and other records that are relevant to conducting an investigation, under the circumstances described in those subparagraphs, not later than 3 business days after the [P&A system] makes a written request for the records involved[.]

42 U.S.C § 15043(a)(2)(B), (I)(I), (J)(I). The DDA Act states that the term “record” includes

(1) a report prepared or received by any staff at any location at which services, supports, or other assistance is provided to individuals with developmental disabilities;

(2) a report prepared by an agency or staff person charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse or neglect, injury, or death occurring at such location, that describes such incidents and the steps taken to investigate such incidents; and

(3) a discharge planning record.

*Id.* § 15043(c). The PAIR Act provides, in relevant part, that a P & A system will “have the same . . . access to records and program income, as are set forth in [the DDA Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 794e (f)(2).

The PAIMI Act and the DDA Act grant a P&A system, under certain circumstances, access to “records.” Each of the acts has a separate, but similar, definition of “records.” The principal issue which we must address in this instance is whether the submitted information constitutes a “record” under either of those acts. In this instance, the submitted information consists of criminal law enforcement investigations that are being utilized for law enforcement purposes. We note that the submitted information is not among the information specifically listed as a “record” in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c).<sup>2</sup> By these statutes’ plain language, access is limited to “records.” *See In re M&S Grading, Inc.*, 457 F.3d 898, 901 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (analysis of a statute must begin with the plain language). Although the two definitions of “records” are not limited to the information specifically enumerated in those clauses, we do not believe that Congress intended for the definitions to be so expansive as to grant a P&A system access to any information it deems necessary. Such a reading of the statutes would render sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) insignificant. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (statute should be construed in a way that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant). Furthermore, in light of Congress’s evident preference for limiting the scope of access, we are unwilling to assume that Congress meant more than it said in enacting the PAIMI Act and the DDA Act. *See Kofa v. INS*, 60 F.3d 1084 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (stating that statutory construction must begin with language of statute; to do otherwise would assume that Congress does not express its intent in words of statutes, but only by way of legislative history); *see generally Coast Alliance v. Babbitt*, 6 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that if, in following Congress’s plain language in statute, agency cannot carry out Congress’s intent, remedy is not to distort or ignore Congress’s words, but rather to ask Congress to address problem).

Based on the above analysis, we believe that the information specifically enumerated in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) is indicative of the types of information to which

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<sup>2</sup>Use of the term “includes” in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) of title 42 of the United States Code indicates that the definitions of “records” are not limited to the information specifically listed in those sections. *See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 78 F.3d 202 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41.

Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. See *Penn. Protection & Advocacy Inc. v. Houstoun*, 228 F.3d 423, 426 n.1 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is clear that the definition of “records” in § 10806 controls the types of records to which [the P&A agency] ‘shall have access’ under § 10805[.]”). As previously noted, the submitted information is not among the information specifically listed as “records” in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c). Furthermore, we find that the submitted information is not the type of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. Accordingly, we find that Advocacy does not have a right of access to the submitted information under either the PAIMI Act or the DDA Act. We therefore conclude that the department may withhold the information that you have marked under section 552.108(a)(1) of the Government Code. The rest of the submitted information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular records at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other records or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For example, governmental bodies are prohibited from asking the attorney general to reconsider this ruling. Gov’t Code § 552.301(f). If the governmental body wants to challenge this ruling, the governmental body must file suit in Travis County within 30 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.324(b). In order to get the full benefit of such a challenge, the governmental body must file suit within 10 calendar days. *Id.* § 552.353(b)(3). If the governmental body does not file suit over this ruling and the governmental body does not comply with it, then both the requestor and the attorney general have the right to file suit against the governmental body to enforce this ruling. *Id.* § 552.321(a).

If this ruling requires the governmental body to release all or part of the requested information, the governmental body is responsible for taking the next step. Based on the statute, the attorney general expects that, upon receiving this ruling, the governmental body will either release the public records promptly pursuant to section 552.221(a) of the Government Code or file a lawsuit challenging this ruling pursuant to section 552.324 of the Government Code. If the governmental body fails to do one of these things, then the requestor should report that failure to the attorney general’s Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. The requestor may also file a complaint with the district or county attorney. *Id.* § 552.3215(e).

If this ruling requires or permits the governmental body to withhold all or some of the requested information, the requestor can challenge that decision by suing the governmental body. *Id.* § 552.321(a); *Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ).

Please remember that under the Act the release of information triggers certain procedures for costs and charges to the requestor. If records are released in compliance with this ruling, be sure that all charges for the information are at or below the legal amounts. Questions or complaints about over-charging must be directed to Hadassah Schloss at the Office of the Attorney General at (512) 475-2497.

If the governmental body, the requestor, or any other person has questions or comments about this ruling, they may contact our office. Although there is no statutory deadline for contacting us, the attorney general prefers to receive any comments within 10 calendar days of the date of this ruling.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'James W. Morris, III', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

James W. Morris, III  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

JWM/jh

Ref: ID# 326155

Enc: Submitted documents

c: Mr. Scott Rewak  
Advocacy, Inc.  
1913 Ring Toal Lane  
Flower Mound, Texas 75028  
(w/o enclosures)