



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

March 28, 2011

Ms. Sheri Bryce Dye
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Bexar County
300 Dolorosa, 4th Floor
San Antonio, Texas 78205

OR2011-04231

Dear Ms. Dye:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 412400.

The Bexar County Sheriff's Office (the "sheriff") received a request for 1) the entire clinical or medical record of a named deceased inmate; 2) the entire jail record of the individual; 3) all investigative reports and supporting documentation pertaining to the individual's death; and 4) any peer review committee documents pertaining to the individual's death. You claim the requested information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.103 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted information. We have also received and considered comments from the requestor. *See* Gov't Code § 552.304 (interested party may submit written comments concerning availability of requested information).

Initially, we must address the sheriff's procedural obligations under the Act. Section 552.301 describes the procedural obligations placed on a governmental body that receives a written request for information that it wishes to withhold. Pursuant to section 552.301(b), the governmental body must ask for the attorney general's decision and state the exceptions that apply within ten business days after receiving the request. *See id.* § 552.301(a), (b). In this instance you state the sheriff received the request for information on January 4, 2011. The copy of the request you have provided to our office is stamped as received on January 4, 2011; however, the field on the stamp for who received the request is left blank. The requestor has submitted to this office a copy of her request for information with a copy of the certified mail return receipt, signed and dated, showing a delivery date of December 15, 2010. The information submitted by the requestor shows her request was received by the sheriff on December 15, 2010, not January 4, 2011. Accordingly, you were required to submit your request for a decision to this office no later than December 30, 2010. However,

you did not request a ruling from this office until January 19, 2011. Consequently, we find the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of section 552.301 in requesting this decision from our office.¹

Pursuant to section 552.302 of the Government Code, a governmental body's failure to comply with the requirements of section 552.301 results in the legal presumption the requested information is public and must be released unless the governmental body demonstrates a compelling reason to withhold the information from disclosure. *See id.* § 552.302; *Simmons v. Kuzmich*, 166 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); *Hancock v. State Bd. of Ins.*, 797 S.W.2d 379, 381-82 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ) (governmental body must make compelling demonstration to overcome presumption of openness pursuant to statutory predecessor to section 552.302); Open Records Decision No. 630 (1994). Normally, a compelling interest is demonstrated when some other source of law makes the information at issue confidential or third-party interests are at stake. *See* Open Records Decision No. 150 at 2 (1977). Although you claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.103 of the Government Code, this is a discretionary exception that protects a governmental body's interests and may be waived. *See* Gov't Code § 552.007; *Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Dallas Morning News*, 4 S.W. 3d 469, 475-76 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.) (governmental body may waive section 552.103). Thus, your claim under section 552.103 is not a compelling reason to overcome the presumption of openness. Therefore, the sheriff may not withhold any of the submitted information under section 552.103. Section 552.101 of the Government Code, however, can provide a compelling reason to overcome this presumption. Accordingly, we address your argument under this exception.

Although you assert the submitted documents are excepted under section 552.101 of the Government Code, we note the requestor is a representative of Disability Rights Texas, formerly known as Advocacy, Inc. ("DRTX"), which has been designated as the state's protection and advocacy system ("P&A system") for purposes of the federal Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act ("PAIMI Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act ("DDA Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act ("PAIR Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794e. *See* Tex. Gov. Exec. Order No. DB-33, 2 Tex. Reg. 3713 (1977); Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 (2002); *see also* 42 C.F.R. §§ 51.2 (defining "designated official" and requiring official to designate agency to be accountable for funds of P&A agency), .22 (requiring P&A agency to have a governing authority responsible for control).

¹As we are able to make this determination, we need not address the requestor's argument the sheriff failed to comply with section 552.301(d) of the Government Code. *See* Gov't Code § 552.301(d)(2) (governmental body must provide a copy of governmental body's written communication to attorney general within ten business days of receiving request for information to requestor).

The PAIMI provides, in relevant part, that Advocacy, as the state's P&A system, shall

(1) have the authority to—

(A) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred[.]

42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(A). Further, the PAIMI provides Advocacy shall

(4) . . . have access to all records of—

. . .

(B) any individual (including an individual who has died or whose whereabouts are unknown)—

(i) who by reason of the mental or physical condition of such individual is unable to authorize the [P&A system] to have such access;

(ii) who does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or for whom the legal guardian is the State; and

(iii) with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the [P&A system] or with respect to whom as a result of monitoring or other activities (either of which result from a complaint or other evidence) there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect[.]

Id. § 10805(a)(4)(B)(i)-(iii). The term “records” as used in the above-quoted provision

includes reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment [to the individual] or reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning records.

Id. § 10806(b)(3)(A); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c) (addressing P&A system's access to records under PAIMI). Further, PAIMI defines the term “facilities” and states the term “may

include, but need not be limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, community facilities for individuals with mental illness, board and care homes, homeless shelters, and jails and prisons.” 42 U.S.C. § 10802(3). The DDA Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system shall

(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred;

...

(I) have access to all records of –

(ii) any individual with a developmental disability, in a situation in which--

(I) the individual, by reason of such individual’s mental or physical condition, is unable to authorize the system to have such access;

(II) the individual does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or the legal guardian of the individual is the State; and

(III) a complaint has been received by the system about the individual with regard to the status or treatment of the individual or, as a result of monitoring or other activities, there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect[.]

Id. § 15043(a)(2)(B), (I)(ii). The DDA Act states the term “record” includes

(1) a report prepared or received by any staff at any location at which services, supports, or other assistance is provided to individuals with developmental disabilities;

(2) a report prepared by an agency or staff person charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse or neglect, injury, or death occurring at such location, that describes such incidents and the steps taken to investigate such incidents; and

(3) a discharge planning record.

Id. § 15043(c). The PAIR Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system will “have the same . . . access to records and program income, as are set forth in [the DDA Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2).

The requestor states the deceased individual suffered from a disability and DRTX received information this individual died while he was an inmate in the custody of the sheriff. DRTX explains it intends to investigate this death for possible incidents of abuse or neglect of an individual with developmental disability as defined by federal law. *See* 42 USC § 15002(8) (defining term “developmental disability”); *see id.* § 10805(a)(4). DRTX asserts the individual at issue does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative acting on his behalf with regard to the investigation of possible abuse and neglect and his death. Additionally, DRTX states it has probable cause to believe the individual’s death may have been the result of abuse and neglect. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 51.2 (stating that the probable cause decision under PAIMI may be based on reasonable inference drawn from one’s experience or training regarding similar incidents, conditions or problems that are usually associated with abuse or neglect).

We note a state statute is preempted by federal law to the extent it conflicts with that federal law. *See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Orange*, 905 F. Supp. 381, 382 (E.D. Tex.1995). Further, federal regulations provide state law must not diminish the required authority of a P&A system. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 1386.21(f); *see also Iowa Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc. v. Rasmussen*, 206 F.R.D. 630, 639 (S.D. Iowa 2001); *Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Gerard*, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (broad right of access under section 15043 of title 42 of the United States Code applies despite existence of any state or local laws or regulations which attempt to restrict access; although state law may expand authority of P&A system, state law cannot diminish authority set forth in federal statutes); *cf.* 42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(2)(C). Similarly, Texas law states, “[n]otwithstanding other state law, [a P&A system] . . . is entitled to access to records relating to persons with mental illness to the extent authorized by federal law.” Health & Safety Code § 615.002(a). Thus, PAIMI and the DDA grant DRTX access to “records” and to the extent state law provides for the confidentiality of “records” requested by DRTX, its federal right of access under PAIMI preempts state law. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c); *see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n*, 905 F. Supp. at 382. Accordingly, we must address whether the submitted information constitutes “records” of an individual with a disability as defined by the DDA and mental illness as defined by PAIMI.

DRTX contends, however, the information listed in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) was not meant to be an exhaustive list.² The requestor contends it was Congress’s intent to

²Use of the term “includes” in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) of title 42 of the United States Code indicates that the definitions of “records” are not limited to the information specifically listed in those sections. *See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 78 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1996); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41.

grant a P&A system access to any and all information, including the particular information at issue here, the P&A system deems necessary to conduct an investigation. We disagree. By these statutes' plain language, access is limited to "records." See *In re M&S Grading, Inc.*, 457 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2000) (analysis of a statute must begin with the plain language). Although the two definitions of "records" are not limited to the information specifically enumerated in those clauses, we do not believe that Congress intended for the definitions to be so expansive as to grant a P&A system access to any information it deems necessary. Such a reading of the statutes would render sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) insignificant. See *Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (statute should be construed in a way that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant). Furthermore, in light of Congress's evident preference for limiting the scope of access, we are unwilling to assume that Congress meant more than it said in enacting the PAIMI Act and the DDA Act. See *Kofa v. INS*, 60 F.3d 1084 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that statutory construction must begin with language of statute; to do otherwise would assume that Congress does not express its intent in words of statutes, but only by way of legislative history); see generally *Coast Alliance v. Babbitt*, 6 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that if, in following Congress's plain language in statute, agency cannot carry out Congress's intent, remedy is not to distort or ignore Congress's words, but rather to ask Congress to address problem).

We note some of the submitted information pertains to an administrative investigation of the named individual's death. We find this information consists of information prepared by the sheriff that describes an incident of possible abuse, neglect, or injury. Thus, in this instance, even though the sheriff claims these documents are excepted from disclosure under section 552.101, this claim is preempted by the PAIMI and the DDA. Accordingly, based on DRTX's representations, we determine DRTX has a right of access to the administrative investigation documents pursuant to subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(4)(B) of section 10805 of title 42 the United States Code and section 15043 of title 42 the United States Code. Thus, the sheriff must release this information to the requestor.

The remaining information consists of jail booking and classification records. In this instance, the remaining information is related to criminal law enforcement and is being utilized for law enforcement purposes. Upon review, we conclude DRTX has failed to demonstrate the applicability of section 10806 of title 42 of the United States Code or section 15043 of title 42 of the United States Code to this information. Accordingly, DRTX does not have a right of access to this information, and we will address the sheriff's claimed exceptions for this information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. This section encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information if it (1) contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685

(Tex. 1976). The type of information considered intimate or embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation* included information relating to sexual assault, pregnancy, mental or physical abuse in the workplace, illegitimate children, psychiatric treatment of mental disorders, attempted suicide, and injuries to sexual organs. *Id.* at 683. We note privacy is a personal right that lapses at death, and thus common-law privacy is not applicable to information that relates only to a deceased individual. *See Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enters. Inc.*, 589 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp.*, 472 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Attorney General Opinions JM-229 (1984), H-917 (1976); Open Records Decision No. 272 (1981). We note the information at issue primarily pertains to a deceased individual. Accordingly, none of this information is protected by common-law privacy and it may not be withheld under section 552.101 on that basis. We have, however, marked information pertaining to other individuals that is highly intimate or embarrassing and is of no legitimate public interest. To the extent these individuals are still living, the sheriff must withhold the marked information under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy. We find none of the remaining information is highly intimate or embarrassing. Consequently, the sheriff may not withhold any of the remaining information under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses constitutional privacy, which protects two kinds of interests. *See Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S.589, 599-600 (1977); *see also* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 at 3-5 (1992), 478 at 4 (1987), 455 at 3-7 (1987). The first is the interest in independence in making certain important decisions related to the “zones of privacy,” pertaining to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education, that have been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. *See Fadjo v. Coon*, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981); *see also* ORD 455 at 3-7. The second constitutionally protected privacy interest is in freedom from public disclosure of certain personal matters. *See Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Tex.*, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.1985); *see also* ORD 455 at 6-7. This aspect of constitutional privacy balances the individual’s privacy interest against the public’s interest in the information. *See* ORD 455 at 7. Constitutional privacy under section 552.101 is reserved for “the most intimate aspects of human affairs.” *Id.* at 8 (quoting *Ramie*, 765 F.2d at 492).

This office has applied constitutional privacy to protect certain information related to incarcerated individuals. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 430 (1985), 428 (1985), 185 (1978). Citing *State v. Ellefson*, 224 S.E.2d 666 (S.C. 1976), as authority, this office held those individuals who correspond with inmates possess a “first amendment right . . . to maintain communication with [the inmate] free of the threat of public exposure,” and this right would be violated by the release of information that identifies those correspondents, because such a release would discourage correspondence. ORD 185 at 2. The information at issue in Open Records Decision No. 185 was the identities of individuals who had corresponded with inmates. In Open Records Decision No. 185, our office found “the public’s right to obtain an inmate’s correspondence list is not sufficient to overcome the first amendment right of the inmate’s correspondents to maintain communication with him free

of the threat of public exposure.” *Id.* Implicit in this holding is the fact an individual’s association with an inmate may be intimate or embarrassing. In Open Records Decision Nos. 428 and 430, our office determined inmate visitor and mail logs that identify inmates and those who choose to visit or correspond with inmates are protected by constitutional privacy because people who correspond with inmates have a First Amendment right to do so that would be threatened if their names were released. ORD 430. Further, we recognized inmates had a constitutional right to visit with outsiders and could also be threatened if their names were released. ORD 428 at 4; *see generally* ORD 185. The rights of those individuals to anonymity was found to outweigh the public’s interest in this information. ORD 185; *see* ORD 430 (list of inmate visitors protected by constitutional privacy of both inmate and visitors). Accordingly, the sheriff must withhold the visitor information we have marked under section 552.101 in conjunction with constitutional privacy.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses laws that make criminal history record information (“CHRI”) confidential. CHRI generated by the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) or by the Texas Crime Information Center (“TCIC”) is confidential under federal and state law. Title 28, part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs the release of CHRI that states obtain from the federal government or other states. Open Records Decision No. 565 at 7 (1990). The federal regulations allow each state to follow its individual law with respect to CHRI it generates. *Id.* Section 411.083 of the Government Code deems confidential CHRI the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) maintains, except DPS may disseminate this information as provided in chapter 411, subchapter F of the Government Code. *See* Gov’t Code § 411.083. Sections 411.083(b)(1) and 411.089(a) authorize a criminal justice agency to obtain CHRI; however, a criminal justice agency may not release CHRI except to another criminal justice agency for a criminal justice purpose. *Id.* § 411.089(b)(1). Other entities specified in chapter 411 of the Government Code are entitled to obtain CHRI from DPS or another criminal justice agency; however, those entities may not release CHRI except as provided by chapter 411. *See generally id.* §§ 411.090-127. Similarly, any CHRI obtained from DPS or any other criminal justice agency must be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with Government Code chapter 411, subchapter F. However, section 411.083 does not apply to active warrant information or other information relating to one’s current involvement with the criminal justice system. *See id.* § 411.081(b) (police department allowed to disclose information pertaining to person’s current involvement in the criminal justice system). We note because the laws that govern the dissemination of information obtained from NCIC and TCIC are based on both law enforcement and privacy interests, the CHRI of a deceased individual that is obtained from a criminal justice agency may be disseminated only as permitted by subchapter F of chapter 411 of the Government Code. *See* ORD 565 at 10-12. Accordingly, the sheriff must withhold the CHRI we have marked under section 552.101 in conjunction with chapter 411 and federal law.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the Medical Practice Act (the “MPA”), subtitle B of title 3 of the Occupations Code, which makes medical records confidential. *See* Occ. Code § 159.001. Section 159.002 of the MPA provides in part:

(a) A communication between a physician and a patient, relative to or in connection with any professional services as a physician to the patient, is confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed except as provided by this chapter.

(b) A record of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient by a physician that is created or maintained by a physician is confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed except as provided by this chapter.

(c) A person who receives information from a confidential communication or record as described by this chapter, other than a person listed in Section 159.004 who is acting on the patient's behalf, may not disclose the information except to the extent that disclosure is consistent with the authorized purposes for which the information was first obtained.

Id. § 159.002(a)-(c). This office has concluded the protection afforded by section 159.002 extends only to records created by either a physician or someone under the supervision of a physician. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 487 (1987), 370 (1983), 343 (1982). Upon review, we find you have failed to demonstrate how any of the remaining information constitutes a medical record for purposes of the MPA. Therefore, none of the remaining information is confidential under the MPA, and no portion of it may be withheld under section 552.101 on that basis.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses section 773.091 of the Health and Safety Code, which provides in relevant part:

(b) Records of the identity, evaluation, or treatment of a patient by emergency medical services personnel or by a physician providing medical supervision that are created by the emergency medical services personnel or physician or maintained by an emergency medical services provider are confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed except as provided by this chapter.

Health & Safety Code § 773.091(b). You assert portions of the remaining information are confidential under section 773.091. None of the remaining information, however, was created by emergency medical services ("EMS") personnel or by a physician providing medical supervision. Consequently, you have failed to demonstrate how any of information at issue constitutes records of the identity, evaluation, or treatment of a patient created by EMS personnel or a physician providing medical supervision. Accordingly, none of the remaining information may be withheld under section 552.101 in conjunction with section 773.091.

In summary, the sheriff must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with (1) common-law privacy, (2)

constitutional privacy, and (3) chapter 411 of the Government Code and federal law. The remaining information must be released to this requestor.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index_orl.php, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act must be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Ana Carolina Vieira
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

ACV/eeg

Ref: ID# 412400

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)