ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

July 5, 2011

Mr. Daniel Bradford
Assistant County Attorney
Travis County
P.O. Box 1748
Austin, Texas 78701

OR2011-09502

Dear Mr. Bradford:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 427128.

The Travis County Sheriff's Office (the "sheriff") received a request for information pertaining to a specified incident. You claim the requested information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.108 of the Government Code. We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision."[1] Gov't Code § 552.101. This exception encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information if it (1) contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). The type of information considered intimate or embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation* included information relating to sexual assault, pregnancy, mental or physical abuse in the workplace, illegitimate children, psychiatric treatment of mental disorders, attempted suicide, and injuries to sexual organs. *Id.* at 683. Generally, only the information that either identifies or tends to identify a victim of sexual

[1]The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception like section 552.101 of the Government Code on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

assault or other sex-related offense may be withheld under common-law privacy. However, a governmental body is required to withhold an entire report when identifying information is inextricably intertwined with other releasable information or when the requestor knows the identity of the alleged victim. Open Records Decision No. 393 at 2 (1983); *see* Open Records Decision No. 339 (1982); *see also Morales v. Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.— El Paso 1992, writ denied) (identity of witnesses to and victim of sexual harassment was highly intimate or embarrassing information and public did not have legitimate interest in such information); Open Records Decision No. 440 (1986) (detailed descriptions of serious sexual offenses must be withheld). In this instance, the requestor knows the identity of the alleged victim. Thus, withholding only the identifying information from the requestor would not preserve the victim's common-law right to privacy. Accordingly, the sheriff must withhold the submitted information in its entirety under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.[2]

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index_orl.php, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act must be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Amy L.S. Shipp
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

ALS/bs

Ref: ID# 427128

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)

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[2]As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address your argument against disclosure.