



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS  
GREG ABBOTT

November 4, 2011

Ms. Tiffany Evans  
Assistant City Attorney  
City of Houston  
P.O. Box 368  
Houston, Texas 77001-0368

OR2011-16271

Dear Ms. Evans:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 435263 (GC No. 18861).

The City of Houston (the "city") received a request for training logs specifying the number of training hours and the substance of any training received by four named police officers for a specified period of time. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code. We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

As you acknowledge, the city failed to comply with section 552.301 of the Government Code in seeking an open records decision from this office. A governmental body's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 552.301 results in the legal presumption the requested information is public and must be released unless the governmental body demonstrates a compelling reason to withhold the information from disclosure. *See* Gov't Code § 552.302; *Simmons v. Kuzmich*, 166 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); *Hancock v. State Bd. of Ins.*, 797 S.W.2d 379,381-82 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ) (governmental body must make compelling demonstration to overcome presumption of openness pursuant to statutory predecessor to section 552.302); Open Records Decision No. 630 (1994). Normally, a compelling interest is demonstrated when some other source of law makes the information at issue confidential or third-party interests are at stake. *See* Open Records Decision No. 150 at 2 (1977). Because your claim under section 552.101 of

the Government Code can provide a compelling reason to overcome this presumption, we will consider whether this exception is applicable to the submitted information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. This exception encompasses information other statutes make confidential. You raise section 552.101 in conjunction with section 143.089 of the Local Government Code. You state the city is a civil service city under chapter 143 of the Local Government Code. Section 143.089 provides for the existence of two different types of personnel files relating to a police officer: one that must be maintained as part of the officer’s civil service file and another the police department may maintain for its own internal use. *See* Local Gov’t Code § 143.089(a), (g). The officer’s civil service file must contain certain specified items, including commendations, periodic evaluations by the police officer’s supervisor, and documents relating to any misconduct in which the department took disciplinary action against the officer under chapter 143 of the Local Government Code. *Id.* § 143.089(a)(1)-(2). Chapter 143 prescribes the following types of disciplinary actions: removal, suspension, demotion, and uncompensated duty. *Id.* §§ 143.051-.055. In cases in which a police department investigates a police officer’s misconduct and takes disciplinary action against an officer, it is required by section 143.089(a)(2) to place all investigatory records relating to the investigation and disciplinary action, including background documents such as complaints, witness statements, and documents of like nature from individuals who were not in a supervisory capacity, in the police officer’s civil service file maintained under section 143.089(a). *See Abbott v. Corpus Christi*, 109 S.W.3d 113, 122 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). All investigatory materials in a case resulting in disciplinary action are “from the employing department” when they are held by or are in the possession of the department because of its investigation into a police officer’s misconduct, and the department must forward them to the civil service commission for placement in the civil service personnel file. *Id.* Such records may not be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 143.089 of the Local Government Code. *See* Local Gov’t Code § 143.089(f); Open Records Decision No. 562 at 6 (1990). However, information maintained in a police department’s internal file pursuant to section 143.089(g) is confidential and must not be released. *City of San Antonio v. Tex. Attorney Gen.*, 851 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ denied).

You inform us the submitted information consists of records maintained only within the city’s police department’s internal personnel files. Based on your representations and our review, we agree the submitted information is generally confidential pursuant to section 143.089(g) of the Local Government Code.

The requestor, however, is a representative of Disability Rights Texas (“DRT”), formerly known as Advocacy, Inc., which has been designated as the state’s protection and advocacy system (“P&A system”) for purposes of the federal Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (the “PAIMI Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, the Developmental

Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (the “DDA Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act (the “PAIR Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794e. *See* Tex. Gov. Exec. Order No. DB-33, 2 Tex. Reg. 3713 (1977); Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 (2002); *see also* 42 C.F.R. §§ 51.2 (defining “designated official” and requiring official to designate agency to be accountable for funds of P&A agency), .22 (requiring P&A agency to have a governing authority responsible for control).

The PAIMI Act provides, in relevant part, that DRT, as the state’s P&A system, shall

(1) have the authority to—

(A) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred[.]

42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(A). Further, the PAIMI Act provides DRT shall

(4) . . . have access to all records of—

...

(B) any individual (including an individual who has died or whose whereabouts are unknown)—

(i) who by reason of the mental or physical condition of such individual is unable to authorize the [P&A system] to have such access;

(ii) who does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or for whom the legal guardian is the State; and

(iii) with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the [P&A system] or with respect to whom as a result of monitoring or other activities (either of which result from a complaint or other evidence) there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect[.]

*Id.* § 10805(a)(4)(B)(i)-(iii). The term “records” as used in the above-quoted provision

includes reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment [to the individual] or reports prepared by an agency charged with

investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning records.

*Id.* § 10806(b)(3)(A); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c) (addressing P&A system's access to records under PAIMI). Further, the PAIMI Act defines the term "facilities" and states the term "may include, but need not be limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, community facilities for individuals with mental illness, board and care homes, homeless shelters, and jails and prisons." 42 U.S.C. § 10802(3). The DDA Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system shall

(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred;

...

(I) have access to all records of—

(ii) any individual with a developmental disability, in a situation in which—

(I) the individual, by reason of such individual's mental or physical condition, is unable to authorize the system to have such access;

(II) the individual does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or the legal guardian of the individual is the State; and

(III) a complaint has been received by the system about the individual with regard to the status or treatment of the individual or, as a result of monitoring or other activities, there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect[.]

*Id.* § 15043(a)(2)(B), (I)(ii). The DDA Act states the term "record" includes

(1) a report prepared or received by any staff at any location at which services, supports, or other assistance is provided to individuals with developmental disabilities;

(2) a report prepared by an agency or staff person charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse or neglect, injury, or death occurring at such location, that describes such incidents and the steps taken to investigate such incidents; and

(3) a discharge planning record.

*Id.* § 15043(c). The PAIR Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system will “have the same . . . access to records and program income, as are set forth in [the DDA Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2).

In this case, the requestor is investigating the death of an individual while in custody of the city’s police department. DRT explains it intends to investigate this death for possible incidents of abuse or neglect of an individual with a developmental disability as defined by federal law. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 15002(8) (defining term “developmental disability”); *see id.* § 10805(a)(4). DRT asserts this individual does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative acting on his behalf with regard to the investigation of possible abuse and neglect and his death. Additionally, DRT states it has probable cause to believe the individual’s death may have been the result of abuse and neglect. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 51.2 (stating that the probable cause decision under the PAIMI Act may be based on reasonable inference drawn from one’s experience or training regarding similar incidents, conditions or problems that are usually associated with abuse or neglect).

We note a state statute is preempted by federal law to the extent it conflicts with that federal law. *See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Orange*, 905 F. Supp 381, 382 (E.D. Tex.1995). Further, federal regulations provide that state law must not diminish the required authority of a P&A system. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 1386.21(f); *see also Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Gerard*, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (broad right of access under section 15043 of title 42 of the United States Code applies despite existence of any state or local laws or regulations which attempt to restrict access; although state law may expand authority of P&A system, state law cannot diminish authority set forth in federal statutes); *Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Rasmussen*, 206 F.R.D. 630, 639 (S.D. Iowa 2001); *cf.* 42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(2)(C). Similarly, Texas law states, “[n]otwithstanding other state law, [a P&A system] . . . is entitled to access to records relating to persons with mental illness to the extent authorized by federal law.” Health & Safety Code § 615.002(a). Thus, the PAIMI Act and the DDA Act grant DRT access to “records,” and to the extent state law provides for the confidentiality of “records” requested by DRT, its federal rights of access under the PAIMI Act and the DDA Act preempt state law. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c); *see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n*, 905 F. Supp. at 382. Accordingly, we must address whether the submitted information constitutes “records” of an individual with a mental illness as defined by the PAIMI Act or a disability as defined by the DDA Act.

Although the definition of “records” is not limited to the information specifically described in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) of title 42 of the United States Code, we do not believe Congress intended for the definitions to be so expansive as to grant a P&A system access to any information it deems necessary.<sup>1</sup> Such a reading of the statute would render sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) insignificant. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (statute should be construed in a way that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant). Furthermore, in light of Congress’s evident preference for limiting the scope of access, we are unwilling to assume that Congress meant more than it said in enacting the PAIMI Act and the DDA Act. *See Kofa v. INS*, 60 F.3d 1084 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that statutory construction must begin with language of statute; to do otherwise would assume that Congress does not express its intent in words of statutes, but only by way of legislative history); *see generally Coast Alliance v. Babbitt*, 6 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that if, in following Congress’s plain language in statute, agency cannot carry out Congress’s intent, remedy is not to distort or ignore Congress’s words, but rather to ask Congress to address problem). Based on this analysis, we believe the information specifically described in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) is indicative of the types of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. *See Penn. Protection & Advocacy Inc. v. Houston*, 228 F.3d 423, 426 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is clear that the definition of “records” in § 10806 controls the types of records to which [the P&A agency] ‘shall have access’ under § 10805[.]”).

The submitted information pertains to the certification and training of the four named police officers. We have no indication the submitted information pertains to an individual diagnosed with a mental illness or a developmental disability. Accordingly, we find DRT does not have a right of access to the submitted information under the PAIMI Act or the DDA Act. We therefore conclude the city must withhold the submitted information under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 143.089(g) of the Local Government Code.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index\\_orl.php](http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index_orl.php), or call the Office of the Attorney General’s Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public

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<sup>1</sup>Use of the term “includes” in section 10806(b)(3)(A) of title 42 of the United States Code indicates the definition of “records” is not limited to the information specifically listed in that section. *See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 78 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1996); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41.

information under the Act must be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the Office of the Attorney General, toll free at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Sean Nottingham  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

SN/agn

Ref: ID# 435263

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)