



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

December 8, 2011

Ms. Donah "Zone" T. Nguyen
For South Texas Food Bank
Person, Whitworth, Borchers & Morales, LLP
P.O. Drawer 6668
Laredo, Texas 78042-6668

OR2011-18074

Dear Ms. Nguyen:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 438995.

The South Texas Food Bank ("STFB") received a request for a list of all paid employees, with names, titles, and wages by pay period and/or monthly total. You claim STFB is not a governmental body subject to the Act. You also assert the requested information is exempted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code. We have considered your arguments and reviewed the submitted information.

We first address the threshold issue of whether STFB is subject to the Act. The Act requires a governmental body to make information that is within its possession or control available to the public, with certain statutory exceptions. *See* Gov't Code §§ 552.002(a), .006, .021. Under the Act, the term "governmental body" includes several enumerated kinds of entities and "the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds[.]" *Id.* § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). "Public funds" means funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state. *Id.* § 552.003(5).

Both the courts and this office previously have considered the scope of the definition of "governmental body" under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. Nat'l*

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 488 U.S. 1042 (1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be “governmental bodies” that are subject to the Act “‘simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body.’” *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228 (quoting Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973)). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted that in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office’s opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-821 (1987), *quoting* ORD-228 (1979). That same opinion informs that “a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a ‘governmental body.’” Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide “services traditionally provided by governmental bodies.”

Id. The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) and the Southwest Conference (the “SWC”), both of which received public funds, were not “governmental bodies” for purposes of the Act, because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. *See Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 230-31.

Both the NCAA and the SWC were associations made up of both private and public universities. The NCAA and the SWC both received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-31. The *Kneeland* court concluded that although the NCAA and the SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act, because the NCAA and SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds that they received from their member public institutions. *See id.* at 231; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic

departments of private-school members of Southwest Conference did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *Id.* at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated that “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which have entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of section 2(1)(F).” *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was determined to be a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status under the Act of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”). The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *Id.* at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted that an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found that “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded that the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent that it received the city’s financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA’s records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.*

We note that the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3 (1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a “governmental body” under the Act. *Id.* at 4. For example, a contract

or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will bring the private entity within the definition of a "governmental body" under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code. Structuring a contract that involves public funds to provide a formula to compute a fixed amount of money for a fixed period of time will not automatically prevent a private entity from constituting a "governmental body" under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii). The overall nature of the relationship created by the contract is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *Id.*

Pursuant to section 552.303(c) of the Government Code, this office sent a notice to you via facsimile requesting that you provide this office with the type, source, and amount of public funds STFB receives, as well as any agreements, contracts, or similar documents concerning the specific amount of funds received from any state agency or any other governmental body of the State of Texas, and how those funds are used by STFB.¹ In response to our inquiry, STFB submitted information reflecting the grants it receives, how the grant funds are allocated, and the terms of the grants received. You explain that STFB is a non-profit organization that receives limited public funds. The submitted information reflects that STFB receives funds from the City of Laredo, Webb County, the Texas Department of Agriculture, and the Health and Human Services Commission (the "HHSC") in exchange for specific and measurable services, in addition to the federal funding and private contributions it receives. Upon consideration of your arguments and review of the funds at issue, we agree. We find that the grants in question impose specific and definite obligations on STFB to provide a measurable amount of services to the City of Laredo, Webb County, the Texas Department of Agriculture, and the HHSC in exchange for specific sums of money. We, therefore, conclude that STFB is not a governmental body under the Act. *See* Gov't Code § 552.003(1)(A); *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 829-31; ORD 228 at 2. Thus, STFB need not comply with this request for information.²

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.


This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index_orl.php,

¹*See* Gov't Code § 552.303(c)-(d) (if attorney general determines that information in addition to that required by section 552.301 is necessary to render decision, written notice of that fact shall be given to governmental body and requestor, and governmental body shall submit necessary additional information to attorney general no later than seventh calendar day after date of receipt of notice.)

²As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address your remaining argument against disclosure.

or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act must be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the Office of the Attorney General, toll free at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Cynthia G. Tynan". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Cynthia G. Tynan
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

CGT/em

Ref: ID# 438995

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)