



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS  
GREG ABBOTT

July 16, 2012

Ms. Leanne Lundy  
Counsel for the Houston Housing Authority  
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Houston, Texas 77057

OR2012-10971

Dear Ms. Lundy:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 458811.

The Houston Housing Authority (the "authority"), which you represent, received a request for all e-mails sent from or to four named individuals during a specified time period that include any of seven specified words or names. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.103, 552.107, and 552.111 of the Government Code.<sup>1</sup> We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.<sup>2</sup>

Initially, we note Exhibit C contains minutes and agendas of public meetings of the authority. Minutes and agendas of a governmental body's public meetings are specifically made public

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<sup>1</sup>We note you have withdrawn your claim under section 552.108 of the Government Code. Further, although you also raise section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 552.107 of the Government Code, we note this office has concluded section 552.101 does not encompass other exceptions found in the Act. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 676 at 1-2 (2002), 575 at 2 (1990). Additionally, although you also raise section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with Texas Rule of Evidence 503, this office has concluded section 552.101 does not encompass discovery privileges. *See* ORDs. 676 at 1-2, 575 at 2.

<sup>2</sup>We assume the "representative sample" of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent these records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

under the Open Meetings Act, chapter 551 of the Government Code. *See* Gov't Code §§ 551.022 (minutes and tape recordings of open meeting are public records and shall be available for public inspection and copying on request to governmental body's chief administrative officer or officer's designee), .043 (notice of meeting of governmental body must be posted in a place readily accessible to general public at least 72 hours before scheduled time of meeting), .053-.054 (district governing bodies required to post notice of meeting at a place convenient to the public in administrative office of district). As a general rule, the exceptions to disclosure found in the Act, such as section 552.111, do not apply to information other statutes make public. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 623 at 3 (1994), 525 at 3 (1989). Therefore, the minutes and agendas of the public meetings contained in Exhibit C, which we have marked, must be released pursuant to section 551.022 of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be demonstrated. *See id.* at 681-82. The type of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation* included information relating to sexual assault, pregnancy, mental or physical abuse in the workplace, illegitimate children, psychiatric treatment of mental disorders, attempted suicide, and injuries to sexual organs. *Id.* at 683. The doctrine of common-law privacy protects a compilation of an individual's criminal history, which is highly embarrassing information, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person. *Cf. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press*, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989) (when considering prong regarding individual's privacy interest, court recognized distinction between public records found in courthouse files and local police stations and compiled summary of information and noted that individual has significant privacy interest in compilation of one's criminal history). Furthermore, we find a compilation of a private citizen's criminal history is generally not of legitimate concern to the public. This office has also found some kinds of medical information or information indicating disabilities or specific illnesses are excepted from required public disclosure under common-law privacy. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 455 (1987) (information pertaining to prescription drugs, specific illnesses, operations and procedures, and physical disabilities protected from disclosure), 422 (1984), 343 (1982). This office has also found personal financial information not relating to the financial transaction between an individual and a governmental body is excepted from required public disclosure under common-law privacy. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 (1992), 545 (1990) (deferred compensation information, participation in voluntary investment program, election of optional insurance coverage, mortgage payments, assets, bills, and credit history).

In Open Records Decision No. 373 (1983), this office determined financial information submitted by applicants for federally-funded housing rehabilitation loans and grants was "information deemed confidential" by a common-law right of privacy. The financial information at issue in Open Records Decision No. 373 included sources of income, salary, mortgage payments, assets, medical and utility bills, social security and veterans benefits, retirement and state assistance benefits, and credit history. Additionally, in Open Records Decision No. 523 (1989), we held the credit reports, financial statements, and financial information included in loan files of individual veterans participating in the Veterans Land Program were excepted from disclosure by the common-law right of privacy. Similarly, we thus conclude financial information relating to an applicant for housing assistance satisfies the first requirement of common-law privacy, in that it constitutes highly intimate or embarrassing facts about the individual, such that its public disclosure would be highly objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

The second requirement of the common-law privacy test requires the information not be of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 668. While the public generally has some interest in knowing whether public funds expended for housing assistance are being given to qualified applicants, we believe ordinarily this interest will not be sufficient to justify the invasion of the applicant's privacy that would result from disclosure of information concerning his or her financial status. *See* ORD 373 (although any record maintained by governmental body is arguably of legitimate public interest, if only relation of individual to governmental body is as applicant for housing rehabilitation grant, second requirement of common-law privacy test not met). In particular cases, a requestor may demonstrate the existence of a public interest that will overcome the second requirement of the common-law privacy test. However, whether there is a public interest in this information sufficient to justify its disclosure must be decided on a case-by-case basis. *See* ORDs 523, 373.

Open Records Decision Nos. 373 and 523 draw a distinction between the confidential "background financial information furnished to a public body about an individual" and "the basic facts regarding a particular financial transaction between the individual and the public body." Open Records Decision Nos. 523, 385 (1983). Subsequent decisions of this office analyze questions about the confidentiality of background financial information consistently with Open Records Decision No. 373. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 (personal financial information not relating to the financial transaction between an individual and a governmental body is protected), 545 (employee's participation in deferred compensation plan private), 523, 481 (1987) (individual financial information concerning applicant for public employment is closed), 480 (1987) (names of students receiving loans and amounts received from Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation are public); *see also* Attorney General Opinions H-1070 (1977), H-15 (1973) (laws requiring financial disclosure by public officials and candidates for office do not invade their privacy rights). *But see* Open Records Decision No. 602 at 5 (1992) (records related to salaries of those employees for whom the city pays a portion are subject to the Act). We note, however, this office has concluded the names and present addresses of current or former residents of a public housing development

are not protected from disclosure under the common-law right to privacy. *See* Open Records Decision No. 318 (1982). Likewise, the amounts paid by a housing authority on behalf of eligible tenants are not protected from disclosure under privacy interests. *See* Open Records Decision No. 268 (1981); *see also* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 at 9–10, 545, 489 (1987), 480. Whether the public has a legitimate interest in an individual's sources of income must be determined on a case-by-case basis. *See* ORD 373 at 4; *see also* ORDs 600, 545.

Upon review, we find the information we have marked is highly intimate or embarrassing and not of legitimate public concern. Therefore, the authority must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. However, we find you have not demonstrated how any portion of the remaining information in Exhibit E is highly intimate or embarrassing and not of legitimate public concern. Thus, none of the remaining information in Exhibit E may be withheld under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy.

You also argue some of the information in Exhibit E is subject to section 552.103 of the Government Code, which provides, in relevant part,

(a) Information is excepted from [required public disclosure] if it is information relating to litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party or to which an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision, as a consequence of the person's office or employment, is or may be a party.

...

(c) Information relating to litigation involving a governmental body or an officer or employee of a governmental body is excepted from disclosure under Subsection (a) only if the litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date that the requestor applies to the officer for public information for access to or duplication of the information.

Gov't Code § 552.103(a), (c). A governmental body has the burden of providing relevant facts and documents to show section 552.103(a) is applicable in a particular situation. The test for meeting this burden is a showing that (1) litigation was pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the governmental body received the request for information, and (2) the information at issue is related to that litigation. *See Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found.*, 958 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.); *Heard v. Houston Post Co.*, 684 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 551 at 4 (1990). A governmental body must meet both prongs of this test for information to be excepted under section 552.103(a). *See* ORD 551.

This office has long held that for purposes of section 552.103, "litigation" includes "contested cases" conducted in a quasi-judicial forum. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 474 (1987), 368 (1983), 336 (1982), 301 (1982). Likewise, "contested cases" conducted under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 2001 of the Government Code, constitute "litigation" for purposes of section 552.103. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 588 (1991) (concerning former State Board of Insurance proceeding), 301 (1982) (concerning hearing before Public Utilities Commission). In determining whether an administrative proceeding is conducted in a quasi-judicial forum, this office has focused on the following factors: (1) whether the dispute is, for all practical purposes, litigated in an administrative proceeding where (a) discovery takes place, (b) evidence is heard, (c) factual questions are resolved, and (d) a record is made; and (2) whether the proceeding is an adjudicative forum of first jurisdiction, *i.e.*, whether judicial review of the proceeding in district court is an appellate review and not the forum for resolving a controversy on the basis of evidence. *See* ORD 588.

To establish litigation is reasonably anticipated, a governmental body must provide this office "concrete evidence showing that the claim that litigation may ensue is more than mere conjecture." *See* Open Records Decision No. 452 at 4 (1986). Concrete evidence to support a claim litigation is reasonably anticipated may include, for example, the governmental body's receipt of a letter containing a specific threat to sue the governmental body from an attorney for a potential opposing party. *See* Open Records Decision No. 555 (1990); *see also* Open Records Decision No. 518 at 5 (1989) (litigation must be "realistically contemplated"). In addition, this office has concluded litigation was reasonably anticipated when the potential opposing party hired an attorney who made a demand for disputed payments and threatened to sue if the payments were not made promptly, or when an individual threatened to sue on several occasions and hired an attorney. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 346 (1982), 288 (1981). On the other hand, this office has determined if an individual publicly threatens to bring suit against a governmental body, but does not actually take objective steps toward filing suit, litigation is not reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 331 (1982). Further, the fact that a potential opposing party has hired an attorney who makes a request for information does not establish litigation is reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 361 (1983).

In this instance, you contend the authority is engaged in litigation with a client. You inform us the authority's client was terminated from a program and has requested her termination be reconsidered. However, you have not explained how the client's request for reconsideration of her termination qualifies as an administrative proceeding conducted in a quasi-judicial forum or constitutes litigation of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature for purposes of section 552.103. *See* Gov't Code § 552.301(e)(1)(A) (requiring governmental body to explain the applicability of the raised exception). We also find you have not otherwise established how the authority reasonably anticipated litigation when it received the request for information. Thus, we find you have not demonstrated the information at issue is related to litigation that was pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the authority received the

request for information, and the authority may not withhold any of the remaining information in Exhibit E under section 552.103 of the Government Code.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information that comes within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. *See* Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. *See* TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *See In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, lawyer representatives, and a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein. *See* TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, *id.*, meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *See Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You state the information submitted as Exhibit B consists of communications involving attorneys for the authority, legal staff, and employees of the authority in their capacities as clients. You state these communications were made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the authority. You state these communications were confidential, and you state the authority has maintained the confidentiality of the information at issue. Based on your representations and our review, we find you have demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to Exhibit B. Accordingly, the authority may withhold Exhibit B under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.

Section 552.111 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “[a]n interagency or intraagency memorandum or letter that would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.111. This exception encompasses the deliberative process privilege. *See* Open Records Decision No. 615 at 2 (1993). The purpose of section 552.111 is to protect advice, opinion, and recommendation in the decisional process and to encourage open and frank discussion in the deliberative process. *See Austin v. City of San Antonio*, 630 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, no writ); Open Records Decision No. 538 at 1-2 (1990).

In Open Records Decision No. 615, this office re-examined the statutory predecessor to section 552.111 in light of the decision in *Texas Department of Public Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ). We determined section 552.111 excepts from disclosure only those internal communications that consist of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting the policymaking processes of the governmental body. *See* ORD 615 at 5. A governmental body’s policymaking functions do not encompass routine internal administrative or personnel matters, and disclosure of information about such matters will not inhibit free discussion of policy issues among agency personnel. *Id.*; *see also City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News*, 22 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2000) (section 552.111 not applicable to personnel-related communications that did not involve policymaking). A governmental body’s policymaking functions do include administrative and personnel matters of broad scope that affect the governmental body’s policy mission. *See* Open Records Decision No. 631 at 3 (1995).

Further, section 552.111 does not protect facts and written observations of facts and events that are severable from advice, opinions, and recommendations. *Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Attorney Gen.*, 37 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); *see* ORD 615 at 5. But if factual information is so inextricably intertwined with material involving advice, opinion, or recommendation as to make severance of the factual data impractical, the factual information also may be withheld under section 552.111. *See* Open Records Decision No. 313 at 3 (1982).

This office has also concluded a preliminary draft of a document that is intended for public release in its final form necessarily represents the drafter’s advice, opinion, and recommendation with regard to the form and content of the final document, so as to be excepted from disclosure under section 552.111. *See* Open Records Decision No. 559 at 2 (1990) (applying statutory predecessor). Section 552.111 protects factual information in the draft that also will be included in the final version of the document. *See id.* at 2-3. Thus, section 552.111 encompasses the entire contents, including comments, underlining, deletions, and proofreading marks, of a preliminary draft of a policymaking document that will be released to the public in its final form. *See id.* at 2.

Section 552.111 can also encompass communications between a governmental body and a third party, including a consultant or other party with a privity of interest. *See* Open Records Decision No. 561 at 9 (1990) (section 552.111 encompasses communications with party with

which governmental body has privity of interest or common deliberative process). For section 552.111 to apply, the governmental body must identify the third party and explain the nature of its relationship with the governmental body. Section 552.111 is not applicable to a communication between the governmental body and a third party unless the governmental body establishes it has a privity of interest or common deliberative process with the third party. *See* ORD 561. We note a governmental body does not share a privity of interest with a third party when the governmental body and the third party are involved in contract negotiations, as the parties' interests are adverse.

You claim the deliberative process privilege under section 552.111 for the remaining information submitted as Exhibit C. You contend some of the information at issue consists of preliminary drafts of policymaking documents intended for public release in their final form. You also state Exhibit C contains communications between employees and officials of the authority and its board of commissioners, as well as contract negotiations between the authority and the City of Houston (the "city") or other entities. We note because the authority and the city and other entities were engaged in negotiations, we find their interests were adverse and they did not share a privity of interest for purposes of the deliberative process privilege. Upon review, we find the information we marked within Exhibit C consists of drafts of policymaking documents intended for release in their final form and internal communications that consist of advice, opinions, or recommendations on the policymaking matters of the authority. Accordingly, the marked information may be withheld under section 552.111 of the Government Code. However, we find the remaining information in Exhibit C is general administrative and purely factual information or has been shared with individuals with whom you have not demonstrated a privity of interest. Thus, we find you have failed to show how any of the remaining information at issue constitutes internal communications that consists of advice, opinions, or recommendations on the policymaking matters of the authority. Accordingly, the authority may not withhold the remaining information in Exhibit C under the deliberative process privilege of section 552.111 of the Government Code.

We note the remaining information contains e-mail addresses that are subject to section 552.137 of the Government Code.<sup>3</sup> Section 552.137 excepts from disclosure "an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body" unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). *See id.* § 552.137(a)-(c). The e-mail addresses at issue are not excluded by subsection (c). Therefore, the authority must withhold the personal e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owners have affirmatively consented to their public disclosure.

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
<sup>3</sup>The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

In summary, the minutes and agendas of the public meetings contained in Exhibit C, which we have marked, must be released pursuant to section 551.022 of the Government Code. The authority must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. The authority may withhold Exhibit B under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code and the information we marked in Exhibit C under section 552.111 of the Government Code. The authority must withhold the personal e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owners have affirmatively consented to their public disclosure. The remaining information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index\\_orl.php](http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index_orl.php), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act must be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the Office of the Attorney General, toll free at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Claire V. Morris Sloan  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

CVMS/som

Ref: ID# 458811

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)