



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

December 19, 2012

Mr. James P. Plummer
Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP
For Centro Partnership San Antonio
300 Convent Street, Suite 2100
San Antonio, Texas 78205-3792

OR2012-20497

Dear Mr. Plummer:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 474361.

Centro Partnership San Antonio ("Centro"), which you represent, received two requests from the same requestor for information pertaining to the employment of a named individual and employee cellular telephone records during a specified time period. You state you have no information responsive to a portion of the request.¹ You contend Centro is not a governmental body subject to the Act. We have considered your submitted arguments.

We first address the threshold issue of whether Centro is subject to the Act. The Act applies to "governmental bodies" as that term is defined in section 552.003(1)(A) of the Government Code. Under the Act, the term "governmental body" includes several enumerated kinds of entities and "the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds[.]" Gov't Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). "Public funds" means funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state. *Id.* § 552.003(5). The determination of whether an entity is a governmental body for purposes of the Act requires an analysis of the

¹The Act does not require a governmental body that receives a request for information to create information that did not exist when the request was received. See *Econ. Opportunities Dev. Corp. v. Bustamante*, 562 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1978, writ dismissed); Open Records Decision Nos. 605 at 2 (1992), 563 at 8 (1990), 555 at 1-2 (1990), 452 at 3 (1986), 362 at 2 (1983).

facts surrounding the entity. See *Blankenship v. Brazos Higher Educ. Auth., Inc.*, 975 S.W.2d 353, 360-62 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. denied). In Attorney General Opinion JM-821 (1987), this office concluded that “the primary issue in determining whether certain private entities are governmental bodies under the Act is whether they are supported in whole or in part by public funds or whether they expend public funds.” Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 2 (1987).

Both the courts and this office previously have considered the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be “governmental bodies” that are subject to the Act “simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body.” *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228 (quoting Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973)). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted that in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office’s opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-821 (1987), quoting ORD-228 (1979). That same opinion informs that “a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a ‘governmental body.’” Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide “services traditionally provided by governmental bodies.”

Id. The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) and the Southwest Conference (the “SWC”), both of which received public funds, were not “governmental bodies” for purposes of the Act, because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. See *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC were associations made up of both private and public universities. Both the NCAA and the SWC received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-31. The *Kneeland* court concluded that although the NCAA and the SWC received public funds from

some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act, because the NCAA and SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds that they received from their member public institutions. *See id.* at 231; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic departments of private-school members of Southwest Conference did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *See* ORD 228 at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated that “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which have entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of section 2(1)(F).” *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was determined to be a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”) under the Act. The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *See* ORD 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted that an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found that “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded that the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent that it received the city’s financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA’s records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.*

In Attorney General Opinion MW-373 (1981), this office examined the University of Texas Law School Foundation (the "UT Law Foundation"), a nonprofit corporation that solicited donations and expended funds to benefit the University of Texas Law School (the "university"). Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, the university provided the UT Law Foundation space in the law school building to carry out its obligations, utilities and telephone services, and reasonable use of university equipment and personnel to coordinate the activities of the UT Law foundation with the educational operations of the university. This office found such services amounted to support for purposes of the Act and concluded "[s]ince the [UT Law] foundation receives support from the university that is financed by public funds, its records relating to the activities supported by public funds will be subject to public scrutiny." Attorney General Opinion MW-373 at 11 (citing ORD 228). The opinion noted the purpose of the UT Law Foundation was to raise funds and provide resources for the benefit of the university, and considered the provision of office space and other assistance enhanced the cost effectiveness of operating the UT Law Foundation. Further, the opinion noted the university retained control over the relationship of the UT Law Foundation and the university through the authority of the university board of regents to control the use of university property. *Id.* Thus, since the UT Law Foundation received general support from the university, and the university is financed by public funds, the UT Law Foundation was found to be a governmental body for purposes of the statutory predecessor of the Act.

In the present case, you state that Centro is a nonprofit corporation that has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (the "memorandum") with the City of San Antonio (the "city") "to guide and assist in future downtown development." You explain, and provide the memorandum showing, that Centro received from the city a grant of \$20,000 in 2010 to fund Centro's start-up costs, including auditing, legal, accounting, and other administrative expenses. Further, you state Centro received an additional \$5,000 grant from the city to fund a specific study. We note that pursuant to the memorandum, Centro agrees to work with the city, as well as private and public partners, to establish and implement a unified vision for the city's downtown area. Additionally, the memorandum states that three city officials will serve on Centro's board of directors. As in Open Records Decision No. 228, where we construed a similar contractual provision, we believe the memorandum places the city in the position of "supporting" the operation of Centro with public funds within the meaning of section 552.003 of the Government Code. *See* ORD 228. Upon review, we find the memorandum provides for the general support and operation of Centro for purposes of the Act.

We further note that the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3 (1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a "governmental body" under the Act. *Id.* at 4. For example, a contract or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will

bring the private entity within the definition of a "governmental body" under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code. The overall nature of the relationship created by the contract is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *Id.*

In this case, based upon our review of the submitted contract, we conclude that the city and Centro share a common purpose and objective such that an agency-type relationship is created. *See* Open Records Decision No. 621 (1993) at 9; *see also* Local Gov't Code § 380.001(a), (b) (providing that governing body of municipality may establish and provide for administration of one or more programs, including programs for making loans and grants of public money and providing personnel and services of the municipality, to promote state or local economic development and to stimulate business and commercial activity in the municipality). Further, we find that some of the specific services that Centro provides pursuant to the contract comprise traditional governmental functions. *See* ORD 621 at 8 n.10. Accordingly, we conclude that Centro falls within the definition of a "governmental body" under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code to the extent it is supported by city funds.

We note, however, that an organization is not necessarily a "governmental body" in its entirety. "The part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds" is a governmental body. Gov't Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii); *see also* ORD 602 (only the records of those portions of the Dallas Museum of Art that were directly supported by public funds are subject to the Act). Accordingly, only those records relating to those parts of Centro's operations that are directly supported by public funds are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act.

Next, we must address Centro's obligations under the Act. Section 552.301(e) of the Government Code requires submission to this office within fifteen business days of receiving the request (1) general written comments stating the reasons why the stated exceptions apply that would allow the information to be withheld, (2) a copy of the written request for information, (3) a signed statement or sufficient evidence showing the date the written request was received, and (4) a copy of the specific information requested or representative samples, labeled to indicate which exceptions apply to which parts of the documents. *See* Gov't Code § 552.301(e). As of the date of this letter, you have not submitted to this office a copy or representative sample of the requested information at issue. Consequently, to the extent the requested records relate to those parts of Centro's operations that are directly supported by public funds, we find Centro failed to comply with the requirements of section 552.301.

Pursuant to section 552.302 of the Government Code, failure to submit to this office the information required in section 552.301(e) results in the legal presumption the requested information is public and must be released. Information that is presumed public must be released, unless a compelling reason to withhold the information is demonstrated to

overcome this presumption. *See id.* § 552.302; *Simmons v. Kuzmich*, 166 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); *Hancock v. State Bd. of Ins.*, 797 S.W.2d 379, 381-82 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ) (must make compelling demonstration to overcome presumption of openness pursuant to statutory predecessor to section 552.302 of the Government Code); *see also* Open Records Decision No. 630 (1994). Generally, a compelling reason to withhold information may be demonstrated by showing the information is made confidential by another source of law or third party interests are affected. *See* ORD 630. Because you have not submitted the requested information for our review, we have no basis for finding any of the information confidential by law. Therefore, we find Centro must release the requested information that is subject to the Act to the requestor pursuant to section 552.302 of the Government Code.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index_orl.php, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act must be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the Office of the Attorney General, toll free at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Cynthia G. Tynan
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

CGT/akg

Ref: ID# 474361

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)