



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

March 21, 2013

Mr. James P. Plummer
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San Antonio, Texas 78205-3792

OR2013-04688

Dear Mr. Plummer:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 482005.

Centro Partnership San Antonio ("Centro"), which you represent, received two requests for (1) information related to the selection or hiring of a named individual and (2) all records created using certain funds. You contend Centro is not a governmental body subject to the Act. We have considered your submitted arguments and reviewed the submitted information.

We first address the threshold issue of whether Centro is subject to the Act. The Act applies to "governmental bodies" as that term is defined in section 552.003(1)(A) of the Government Code. Under the Act, the term "governmental body" includes several enumerated kinds of entities and "the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds[.]" Gov't Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii). "Public funds" means funds of the state or of a governmental subdivision of the state. *Id.* § 552.003(5). The determination of whether an entity is a governmental body for purposes of the Act requires an analysis of the facts surrounding the entity. *See Blankenship v. Brazos Higher Educ. Auth., Inc.*, 975 S.W.2d 353, 360-62 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. denied). In Attorney General Opinion JM-821 (1987), this office concluded that "the primary issue in determining whether certain private entities are governmental bodies under the Act is whether they are supported in whole

or in part by public funds or whether they expend public funds.” Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 2 (1987).

Both the courts and this office previously have considered the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act and its statutory predecessor. In *Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Association*, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that opinions of this office do not declare private persons or businesses to be “governmental bodies” that are subject to the Act “simply because [the persons or businesses] provide specific goods or services under a contract with a government body.” *Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 228 (quoting Open Records Decision No. 1 (1973)). Rather, the *Kneeland* court noted that in interpreting the predecessor to section 552.003 of the Government Code, this office’s opinions generally examine the facts of the relationship between the private entity and the governmental body and apply three distinct patterns of analysis:

The opinions advise that an entity receiving public funds becomes a governmental body under the Act, unless its relationship with the government imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JM-821 (1987), quoting ORD-228 (1979). That same opinion informs that “a contract or relationship that involves public funds and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity will bring the private entity within the . . . definition of a ‘governmental body.’” Finally, that opinion, citing others, advises that some entities, such as volunteer fire departments, will be considered governmental bodies if they provide “services traditionally provided by governmental bodies.”

Id. The *Kneeland* court ultimately concluded that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) and the Southwest Conference (the “SWC”), both of which received public funds, were not “governmental bodies” for purposes of the Act, because both provided specific, measurable services in return for those funds. *See Kneeland*, 850 F.2d at 230-31. Both the NCAA and the SWC were associations made up of both private and public universities. Both the NCAA and the SWC received dues and other revenues from their member institutions. *Id.* at 226-28. In return for those funds, the NCAA and the SWC provided specific services to their members, such as supporting various NCAA and SWC committees; producing publications, television messages, and statistics; and investigating complaints of violations of NCAA and SWC rules and regulations. *Id.* at 229-31. The *Kneeland* court concluded that although the NCAA and the SWC received public funds from some of their members, neither entity was a “governmental body” for purposes of the Act, because the NCAA and SWC did not receive the funds for their general support. Rather, the NCAA and the SWC provided “specific and gaugeable services” in return for the funds that

they received from their member public institutions. *See id.* at 231; *see also A.H. Belo Corp. v. S. Methodist Univ.*, 734 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (athletic departments of private-school members of Southwest Conference did not receive or spend public funds and thus were not governmental bodies for purposes of Act).

In exploring the scope of the definition of “governmental body” under the Act, this office has distinguished between private entities that receive public funds in return for specific, measurable services and those entities that receive public funds as general support. In Open Records Decision No. 228 (1979), we considered whether the North Texas Commission (the “commission”), a private, nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of promoting the interests of the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, was a governmental body. *See* ORD 228 at 1. The commission’s contract with the City of Fort Worth obligated the city to pay the commission \$80,000 per year for three years. *Id.* The contract obligated the commission, among other things, to “[c]ontinue its current successful programs and implement such new and innovative programs as will further its corporate objectives and common City’s interests and activities.” *Id.* at 2. Noting this provision, this office stated that “[e]ven if all other parts of the contract were found to represent a strictly arms-length transaction, we believe that this provision places the various governmental bodies which have entered into the contract in the position of ‘supporting’ the operation of the Commission with public funds within the meaning of section 2(1)(F).” *Id.* Accordingly, the commission was determined to be a governmental body for purposes of the Act. *Id.*

In Open Records Decision No. 602 (1992), we addressed the status of the Dallas Museum of Art (the “DMA”) under the Act. The DMA was a private, nonprofit corporation that had contracted with the City of Dallas to care for and preserve an art collection owned by the city and to maintain, operate, and manage an art museum. *See* ORD 602 at 1-2. The contract required the city to support the DMA by maintaining the museum building, paying for utility service, and providing funds for other costs of operating the museum. *Id.* at 2. We noted that an entity that receives public funds is a governmental body under the Act, unless the entity’s relationship with the governmental body from which it receives funds imposes “a specific and definite obligation . . . to provide a measurable amount of service in exchange for a certain amount of money as would be expected in a typical arms-length contract for services between a vendor and purchaser.” *Id.* at 4. We found that “the [City of Dallas] is receiving valuable services in exchange for its obligations, but, in our opinion, the very nature of the services the DMA provides to the [City of Dallas] cannot be known, specific, or measurable.” *Id.* at 5. Thus, we concluded that the City of Dallas provided general support to the DMA facilities and operation, making the DMA a governmental body to the extent that it received the city’s financial support. *Id.* Therefore, the DMA’s records that related to programs supported by public funds were subject to the Act. *Id.*

In Attorney General Opinion MW-373 (1981), this office examined the University of Texas Law School Foundation (the “UT Law Foundation”), a nonprofit corporation that solicited donations and expended funds to benefit the University of Texas Law School

(the “university”). Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding, the university provided the UT Law Foundation space in the law school building to carry out its obligations, utilities and telephone services, and reasonable use of university equipment and personnel to coordinate the activities of the UT Law foundation with the educational operations of the university. This office found such services amounted to support for purposes of the Act and concluded “[s]ince the [UT Law] foundation receives support from the university that is financed by public funds, its records relating to the activities supported by public funds will be subject to public scrutiny.” Attorney General Opinion MW-373 at 11 (citing ORD 228). The opinion noted the purpose of the UT Law Foundation was to raise funds and provide resources for the benefit of the university, and considered the provision of office space and other assistance enhanced the cost effectiveness of operating the UT Law Foundation. Further, the opinion noted the university retained control over the relationship of the UT Law Foundation and the university through the authority of the university board of regents to control the use of university property. *Id.* Thus, since the UT Law Foundation received general support from the university, and the university is financed by public funds, the UT Law Foundation was found to be a governmental body for purposes of the statutory predecessor of the Act.

In the present case, you state that Centro is a nonprofit corporation that has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (the “memorandum”) with the City of San Antonio (the “city”) “to guide and assist in future downtown development.” You explain, and provide the memorandum showing, that Centro received from the city a grant of \$20,000 in 2010 to fund Centro’s start-up costs, including auditing, legal, accounting, and other administrative expenses. Further, you state Centro received an additional \$5,000 grant from the city to fund a specific study. We note that pursuant to the memorandum, Centro agrees to work with the city, as well as private and public partners, to establish and implement a unified vision for the city’s downtown area. Additionally, the memorandum states that three city officials will serve on Centro’s board of directors. As in Open Records Decision No. 228, where we construed a similar contractual provision, we believe the memorandum places the city in the position of “supporting” the operation of Centro with public funds within the meaning of section 552.003 of the Government Code. *See* ORD 228. Upon review, we find the memorandum provides for the general support and operation of Centro for purposes of the Act.

We further note that the precise manner of public funding is not the sole dispositive issue in determining whether a particular entity is subject to the Act. *See* Attorney General Opinion JM-821 at 3 (1987). Other aspects of a contract or relationship that involves the transfer of public funds between a private and a public entity must be considered in determining whether the private entity is a “governmental body” under the Act. *Id.* at 4. For example, a contract or relationship that involves public funds, and that indicates a common purpose or objective or that creates an agency-type relationship between a private entity and a public entity, will bring the private entity within the definition of a “governmental body” under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code. The overall nature of the relationship

created by the contract is relevant in determining whether the private entity is so closely associated with the governmental body that the private entity falls within the Act. *Id.*

In this case, based upon our review of the submitted contract, we conclude the city and Centro share a common purpose and objective such that an agency-type relationship is created. *See* Open Records Decision No. 621 (1993) at 9; *see also* Local Gov't Code § 380.001(a), (b) (providing that governing body of municipality may establish and provide for administration of one or more programs, including programs for making loans and grants of public money and providing personnel and services of the municipality, to promote state or local economic development and to stimulate business and commercial activity in the municipality). Further, we find some of the specific services Centro provides pursuant to the contract comprise traditional governmental functions. *See* ORD 621 at 8 n.10. Accordingly, we conclude Centro falls within the definition of a "governmental body" under section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) of the Government Code to the extent it is supported by city funds.

We note, however, an organization is not necessarily a "governmental body" in its entirety. "The part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds" is a governmental body. Gov't Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii); *see also* ORD 602 (only the records of those portions of the Dallas Museum of Art that were directly supported by public funds are subject to the Act). Accordingly, only those records relating to those parts of Centro's operations that are directly supported by public funds are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act.

You state the information in Exhibit B pertains to the selection and hiring of the individual named in the first request. You explain none of the funds Centro received from the city were spent on the selection or hiring of the named individual. You further state the named individual's salary will be paid entirely with private funds. Upon review, we have no indication the information in Exhibit B is related to operations supported by public funds. Accordingly, the information in Exhibit B is not public information subject to the Act and need not be released to the requestor in response to the request. However, you state the information in Exhibit C relates to the expenditure of funds received from the city. Thus, the information in Exhibit C is subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act.

We note some of the information in Exhibit C is subject to sections 552.101, 552.136, and 552.137 of the Government Code.¹ Section 552.101 excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses section 6103(a)

¹The Office of the Attorney General will raise mandatory exceptions on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

of title 26 of the United States Code. Prior decisions of this office have held that section 6103(a) renders tax return information confidential. See Attorney General Opinion H-1274 (1978) (tax returns); Open Records Decision Nos. 600 (1992) (W-4 forms), 226 (1979) (W-2 forms). Section 6103(b) defines the term “return information” as “a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments or tax payments . . . or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary [of the Internal Revenue Service] with respect to a return or . . . the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability . . . for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A). Federal courts have construed the term “return information” expansively to include any information gathered by the Internal Revenue Service regarding a taxpayer’s liability under title 26 of the United States Code. See *Mallas v. Kolak*, 721 F. Supp. 748, 754 (M.D.N.C. 1989), *dismissed in part, aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded*, 993 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1993). Therefore, we conclude that information pertaining to a tax levy constitutes “tax return information” as contemplated by section 6103(a) of title 26 of the United States Code. See *Johnson v. Sawyer*, 120 F.3d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1997) (tax return information is confidential unless disclosure is permitted by exception found in section 6103) (citing *Chandler v. United States*, 687 F. Supp. 1515, 1516 n.1 (C.D. Utah 1988), *aff’d*, 887 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1989) (notice of levy disclosed tax return information)). Accordingly, Centro must withhold the tax information we have marked in Exhibit C pursuant to section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 6103(a) of title 26 of the United States Code.

Section 552.136 of the Government Code provides “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a credit card, debit card, charge card, or access device number that is collected, assembled, or maintained by or for a governmental body is confidential.” Gov’t Code § 552.136. Upon review, we find Centro must withhold the information we have marked in Exhibit C under section 552.136 of the Government Code.

Section 552.137 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). See *id.* § 552.137(a)-(c). The e-mail address at issue is not excluded by subsection (c). Therefore, Centro must withhold the personal e-mail address we have marked in Exhibit C under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owner affirmatively consents to its disclosure.²

²Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009) is a previous determination to all governmental bodies authorizing them to withhold certain categories of information, including e-mail addresses of members of the public under section 552.137 of the Government Code, without the necessity of requesting an attorney general decision.

In summary, the information in Exhibit B is not public information subject to the Act and need not be released to the requestor in response to the request. Centro must withhold the tax information we have marked in Exhibit C pursuant to section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 6103(a) of title 26 of the United States Code and the information we have marked in Exhibit C under section 552.136 of the Government Code. Centro must also withhold the personal e-mail address we have marked in Exhibit C under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owner affirmatively consents to its disclosure. Centro must release the remaining information in Exhibit C.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/index_orl.php, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act must be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Jennifer Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

JB/tch

Ref: ID# 482005

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)