



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT

April 30, 2014

Ms. Jenny Wells
General Counsel
Leander Independent School District
P.O. Box 218
Leander, Texas 78646-0218

OR2014-07174

Dear Ms. Wells:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 522041 (Leander Request # 922).

The Leander Independent School District (the "district") received a request for e-mails sent to or from a list of named district employees that mention one of two named individuals.¹ You claim some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.107 of the Government Code.² We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.³

¹We note the district sought and received clarification of the information requested. *See* Gov't Code § 552.222 (providing if request for information is unclear, governmental body may ask requestor to clarify request); *see also* *City of Dallas v. Abbott*, 304 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (holding that when a governmental entity, acting in good faith, requests clarification or narrowing of an unclear or over-broad request for public information, the ten-day period to request an attorney general ruling is measured from the date the request is clarified or narrowed).

²Although you claim Texas Rule of Evidence 503, we note the proper exception to raise when asserting the attorney-client privilege for information not subject to section 552.022 of the Government Code is section 552.107 of the Government Code. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 676 at 1-2 (2002), 575 at 2 (1990).

³We assume the "representative sample" of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

Initially, we note the United States Department of Education Family Policy Compliance Office (the "DOE") has informed this office that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, does not permit state and local educational authorities to disclose to this office, without parental consent, unredacted, personally identifiable information contained in education records for the purpose of our review in the open records ruling process under the Act.⁴ Consequently, state and local educational authorities that receive a request for education records from a member of the public under the Act must not submit education records to this office in unredacted form, that is, in a form in which "personally identifiable information" is disclosed. *See* 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (defining "personally identifiable information"). You have submitted unredacted education records for our review. Because our office is prohibited from reviewing education records, we will not address the applicability of FERPA to the submitted records, except to note parents have a right of access under FERPA to their children's education records. *See* 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3. The DOE has informed us, however, that a parent's right of access under FERPA to information about the parent's child does not prevail over an educational institution's right to assert the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, we will consider the district's assertion of this privilege under section 552.107 of the Government Code.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information that comes within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. *See* ORD 676 at 6-7. First, a governmental body must demonstrate the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services" to the client governmental body. *See* TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *See In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, lawyer representatives, and a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein. *See* TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, *id.*, meaning it was "not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the

⁴ A copy of this letter may be found on the Office of the Attorney General's website: <http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/20060725usdoe.pdf>.

rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *See Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You claim the information submitted in Exhibit 1 is protected by section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. You state the information at issue consists of communications between district attorneys and district employees, in their capacities as clients. You state the communications were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the district and these communications have remained confidential. Based on your representations and our review, we find you have demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the information at issue. Thus, the district may withhold Exhibit 1 under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. Additionally, this office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. *See Open Records Decision No. 455* (1987). You claim a portion of the information submitted as Exhibit 2 is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy. Upon review, however, we find you have not demonstrated how any of the information you have marked is highly intimate or embarrassing and not of legitimate public concern. Thus, none of the remaining information may be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

In summary, the district may withhold Exhibit 1 under section 552.107 of the Government Code. The district must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Lana L. Freeman
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

LLF/bhf

Ref: ID# 522041

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)