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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

January 26, 2016

Mr. Guillermo Trevino
Assistant City Attorney
Office of the City Attorney
City of Fort Worth
1000 Throckmorton Street, 3rd Floor
Fort Worth, Texas 76102

OR2016-01887

Dear Mr. Trevino:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 595329 (PIR No. W046884-102715).

The City of Fort Worth (the "city") received a request for all e-mails sent to and from the account of a named individual, from within a specific date range. The city states it will release some information to the requestor upon payment of the cost estimate deposit. The city claims portions of the submitted information are excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.103, 552.107, and 552.111 of the Government Code.¹ We have

¹We note the city also claims the informer's privilege under Texas Rule of Evidence 508. The Texas Supreme Court has held the Texas Rules of Evidence are "other law" within the meaning of section 552.022 of the Government Code. *See In re City of Georgetown*, 53 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. 2001); *see also* Gov't Code § 552.022(a). In this instance, section 552.022 is not applicable to the information the city seeks to withhold under the informer's privilege and, therefore, we do not address the city's argument under rule 508.

considered the exceptions the city claims and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information².

Section 552.103 of the Government Code provides as follows:

(a) Information is excepted from [required public disclosure] if it is information relating to litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party or to which an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision, as a consequence of the person's office or employment, is or may be a party.

...

(c) Information relating to litigation involving a governmental body or an officer or employee of a governmental body is excepted from disclosure under Subsection (a) only if the litigation is pending or reasonably anticipated on the date that the requestor applies to the officer for public information for access to or duplication of the information.

Gov't Code § 552.103(a), (c). A governmental body has the burden of providing relevant facts and documents to show that the section 552.103(a) exception is applicable in a particular situation. The test for meeting this burden is a showing that (1) litigation was pending or reasonably anticipated on the date the governmental body received the request for information, and (2) the information at issue is related to that litigation. *Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. v. Tex. Legal Found.*, 958 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, orig. proceeding); *Heard v. Houston Post Co.*, 684 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 551 at 4 (1990). A governmental body must meet both prongs of this test for information to be excepted under section 552.103(a).

To establish litigation is reasonably anticipated, a governmental body must provide this office with “concrete evidence showing the claim that litigation may ensue is more than mere conjecture.” Open Records Decision No. 452 at 4 (1986). Whether litigation is reasonably anticipated must be determined on a case-by-case basis. *See id.* Concrete evidence to support a claim litigation is reasonably anticipated may include, for example, the governmental body's receipt of a letter containing a specific threat to sue the governmental

²We assume the “representative sample” of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

body from an attorney for a potential opposing party.³ *See* Open Records Decision No. 555 (1990); *see also* Open Records Decision No. 518 at 5 (1989) (litigation must be “realistically contemplated”). On the other hand, this office has determined that if an individual publicly threatens to bring suit against a governmental body, but does not actually take objective steps toward filing suit, litigation is not reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 331 (1982). Further, the fact a potential opposing party has hired an attorney who makes a request for information does not establish litigation is reasonably anticipated. *See* Open Records Decision No. 361 (1983).

The city states the information it has marked pertains to a pending employee grievance procedure initiated against the city by a city employee under section 554.006 of the Government Code, the Whistleblower Act, for alleged wrongful and retaliatory actions on the part of the city in response to the employee’s claims of misconduct by another employee. Section 554.006 of the Government Code provides, in part, that an aggrieved party must initiate action under the grievance or appeal procedures of the employing state or local governmental entity before filing suit. *See* Gov’t Code § 554.006(a). The city indicates the grievance was initiated prior to the city’s receipt of the request for the information. Based on these representations and our review of the information at issue, we find the city has demonstrated the information it has marked is related to litigation the city reasonably anticipated when it received this request for information. Accordingly, the city may withhold the information it has marked under section 552.103 of the Government Code.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the

³In addition, this office has concluded litigation was reasonably anticipated when the potential opposing party took the following objective steps toward litigation: filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, *see* Open Records Decision No. 336 (1982); hired an attorney who made a demand for disputed payments and threatened to sue if the payments were not made promptly, *see* Open Records Decision No. 346 (1982); and threatened to sue on several occasions and hired an attorney, *see* Open Records Decision No. 288 (1981).

government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a *confidential* communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

The city states the information it has marked consists of confidential communications involving city staff and the city attorney. The city states these communications were made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the city. The city states the confidentiality of these communications has been maintained. Based on these representations and our review, we find the city has demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the information at issue. Thus, the city may withhold the information it has marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.

Section 552.111 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “[a]n interagency or intraagency memorandum or letter that would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.111. This exception encompasses the deliberative process privilege. *See* Open Records Decision No. 615 at 2 (1993). The purpose of section 552.111 is to protect advice, opinion, and recommendation in the decisional process and to encourage open and frank discussion in the deliberative process. *See Austin v. City of San Antonio*, 630 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 538 at 1-2 (1990).

In Open Records Decision No. 615 (1993), this office re-examined the statutory predecessor to section 552.111 in light of the decision in *Texas Department of Public Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ). We determined that section 552.111 excepts from disclosure only those internal communications that consist of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting the policymaking processes of the governmental body. *See* ORD 615 at 5. A governmental body’s policymaking functions do not encompass routine internal administrative or personnel matters, and disclosure of information about such matters will not inhibit free discussion of policy issues

among agency personnel. *Id.*; see also *City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News*, 22 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2000) (section 552.111 not applicable to personnel-related communications that did not involve policymaking). A governmental body's policymaking functions do include administrative and personnel matters of broad scope that affect the governmental body's policy mission. See Open Records Decision No. 631 at 3 (1995). Additionally, section 552.111 does not generally except from disclosure purely factual information that is severable from the opinion portions of internal memoranda. *Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Attorney Gen.*, 37 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); ORD 615 at 4-5. But if factual information is so inextricably intertwined with material involving advice, opinion, or recommendation as to make severance of the factual data impractical, the factual information also may be withheld under section 552.111. See Open Records Decision No. 313 at 3 (1982).

This office has also concluded a preliminary draft of a document intended for public release in its final form necessarily represents the drafter's advice, opinion, and recommendation with regard to the form and content of the final document, so as to be excepted from disclosure under section 552.111. See Open Records Decision No. 559 at 2 (1990) (applying statutory predecessor). Section 552.111 protects factual information in the draft that also will be included in the final version of the document. See *id.* at 2-3. Thus, section 552.111 encompasses the entire contents, including comments, underlining, deletions, and proofreading marks, of a preliminary draft of a policymaking document that will be released to the public in its final form. See *id.* at 2.

The city asserts the information it has marked consists of advice, recommendations, and opinions regarding policymaking decisions. The city also states the information at issue includes draft documents we understand were intended to be released in their final form. Based on these representations and our review, we find the city may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.111 of the Government Code. However, the remaining information is either factual in nature or consists of internal administrative matters that do not rise to the level of policymaking. Therefore, we find the city has failed to demonstrate the remaining information constitutes internal communications containing advice, recommendations, or opinions reflecting the policymaking processes of the city. Accordingly, none of the remaining information may be withheld under section 552.111 of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. The city raises section 552.101 in conjunction with the common-law informer's privilege, which Texas courts have long recognized. See *Aguilar v. State*, 444 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). The informer's privilege protects from disclosure the identities of persons who report activities over which the governmental body has criminal or quasi-criminal law-enforcement authority, provided the subject of the information does not already know the informer's identity. See Open Records Decision No. 208 at 1-2 (1978).

The informer's privilege protects the identities of individuals who report violations of statutes to the police or similar law-enforcement agencies, as well as those who report violations of statutes with civil or criminal penalties to "administrative officials having a duty of inspection or of law enforcement within their particular spheres." Open Records Decision No. 279 at 1-2 (1981) (citing 8 John H. Wigmore, *Evidence in Trials at Common Law*, § 2374, at 767 (J. McNaughton Rev. Ed. 1961)). The report must be of a violation of a criminal or civil statute. See Open Records Decision Nos. 582 at 2 (1990), 515 at 4 (1988).

The city claims the informer's privilege for the identity of a complainant who reported alleged violations of sections of the Fort Worth City Code to the city. The city states it has no indication the subject of the complaint knows the identity of the complainant. The city also states a person violating the code sections at issue is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine. Based on these representations and our review, we conclude the city may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the common-law informer's privilege. See Open Records Decision No. 156 (1977) (name of person who makes complaint about another individual to city's animal control division is excepted by informer's privilege so long as information furnished discloses potential violation of state law). However, the city has failed to demonstrate any of the remaining information it has marked identifies an individual who made a report of a criminal violation to the city for purposes of the informer's privilege. Accordingly, the city may not withhold any of the remaining information at issue under section 552.101 of the Government Code on that basis.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. Additionally, this office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. See Open Records Decision No. 455 (1987). We note, however, the public generally has a legitimate interest in information relating to public employment and public employees. See Open Records Decision Nos. 562 at 10 (1990) (personnel file information does not involve most intimate aspects of human affairs, but in fact touches on matters of legitimate public concern), 470 (1987) (public employee's job performance does not generally constitute employee's private affairs), 444 (1986) (public has legitimate interest in knowing reasons for dismissal, demotion, promotion, or resignation of public employee), 423 at 2 (1984) (scope of public employee privacy is narrow). We further note the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the general details of a crime. See generally *Lowe v. Hearst Communications, Inc.*, 487 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting a "legitimate public interest in facts tending to support an allegation of criminal activity" (citing *Cinel v. Connick*, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (5th

Cir. 1994)); *Houston Chronicle*, 531 S.W.2d at 186-187 (public has legitimate interest in details of crime and police efforts to combat crime in community). Lastly, under the common-law right of privacy, an individual has a right to be free from the publicizing of private affairs in which the public has no legitimate concern. *See Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 682. In considering whether a public citizen's date of birth is private, the Third Court of Appeals looked to the supreme court's rationale in *Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas*, 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010). *Paxton v. City of Dallas*, No. 03-13-00546-CV, 2015 WL 3394061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The supreme court concluded public employees' dates of birth are private under section 552.102 of the Government Code because the employees' privacy interest substantially outweighed the negligible public interest in disclosure.⁴ *Texas Comptroller*, 354 S.W.3d at 347-48. Based on *Texas Comptroller*, the court of appeals concluded the privacy rights of public employees apply equally to public citizens, and thus, public citizens' dates of birth are also protected by common-law privacy pursuant to section 552.101. *City of Dallas*, 2015 WL 3394061, at *3. Upon review, we find the information we have marked satisfies the standard articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation*. Accordingly, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. However, none of the remaining information is highly intimate or embarrassing and of no legitimate public interest and thus, none of it may be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code on that basis.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of constitutional privacy, which consists of two interrelated types of privacy: (1) the right to make certain kinds of decisions independently and (2) an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. *See* ORD 455 at 4. The first type protects an individual's autonomy within "zones of privacy," which include matters related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. *Id.* The second type of constitutional privacy requires a balancing between the individual's privacy interests and the public's need to know information of public concern. *Id.* The scope of information protected is narrower than that under the common-law doctrine of privacy; the information must concern the "most intimate aspects of human affairs." *Id.* at 5 (citing *Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Texas*, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985)). Upon review, we find the city has failed to demonstrate any of the remaining information falls within the zones of privacy or implicates an individual's privacy interests for purposes of constitutional privacy. Therefore, the city may not withhold any of the remaining information under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with constitutional privacy.

⁴Section 552.102(a) exempts from disclosure "information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Gov't Code § 552.102(a).

Section 552.117(a)(1) of the Government Code excepts from disclosure the home address and telephone number, emergency contact information, social security number, and family member information of a current or former employee or official of a governmental body who requests this information be kept confidential under section 552.024 of the Government Code. *See* Gov't Code §§ 552.117(a)(1), .024. We note section 552.117 is also applicable to personal cellular telephone numbers, provided the cellular telephone service is not paid for by a governmental body. *See* Open Records Decision No. 506 at 5-6 (1988) (section 552.117 not applicable to cellular telephone numbers paid for by governmental body and intended for official use). Whether a particular item of information is protected by section 552.117(a)(1) must be determined at the time of the governmental body's receipt of the request for the information. *See* Open Records Decision No. 530 at 5 (1989). Thus, information may only be withheld under section 552.117(a)(1) on behalf of a current or former employee who made a request for confidentiality under section 552.024 prior to the date of the governmental body's receipt of the request for the information. Therefore, to the extent the individuals whose information is at issue timely requested confidentiality under section 552.024 of the Government Code and the cellular telephone service is not paid for by a governmental body, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.117(a)(1) of the Government Code. Conversely, to the extent the individuals at issue did not timely request confidentiality under section 552.024 or the cellular telephone service is paid for by a governmental body, the city may not withhold the information we have marked under section 552.117(a)(1).

Section 552.137 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body" unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c).⁵ *See* Gov't Code § 552.137(a)-(c). The e-mail address at issue is not excluded by subsection (c). Therefore, the city must withhold the personal e-mail address we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owner affirmatively consents to its public disclosure.

In summary, the city may withhold the information it has marked under section 552.103 of the Government Code. The city may withhold the information it has marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. The city may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.111 of the Government Code. The city may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the common-law informer's privilege. The city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. To the extent the individuals whose information is at issue timely requested

⁵The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470(1987).

confidentiality under section 552.024 of the Government Code and the cellular telephone service is not paid for by a governmental body, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.117(a)(1) of the Government Code. The city must withhold the personal e-mail address we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owner affirmatively consents to its public disclosure. The city must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Rahat Huq
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

RSH/som

Ref: ID# 595329

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)