



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

February 17, 2016

Mr. Douglas E. Manning
Assistant County Attorney
Orange County District Attorney's Office
801 Division
Orange, Texas 77630

OR2016-03733

Dear Mr. Manning:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 598954.

The Orange County Sheriff's Office (the "sheriff's office") received a request for information relating to specified types of incidents taking place on two named bridges during a specified time period, including information relating to six specified incidents.¹ The sheriff's office states it has released some of the requested information. The sheriff's office claims some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.130 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions the sheriff's office claims and reviewed the submitted information.

Initially, we note the sheriff's office has not submitted any information relating to the six specified incidents. We assume, to the extent any information responsive to this portion of the request existed on the date the sheriff's office received the request, the sheriff's office has released it. If the sheriff's office has not released any such information, it must do so at this time. *See* Gov't Code §§ 552.006, .301, .302; *see also* Open Records Decision No. 664 (2000) (if governmental body concludes no exceptions apply to requested information, it must release information as soon as possible).

¹We note the sheriff's office sought and received clarification of the information requested. *See* Gov't Code § 552.222 (providing if request for information is unclear, governmental body may ask requestor to clarify request); *see also* *City of Dallas v. Abbott*, 304 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (holding that when a governmental entity, acting in good faith, requests clarification or narrowing of an unclear or over-broad request for public information, the ten-day period to request an attorney general ruling is measured from the date the request is clarified or narrowed).

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses laws that make criminal history record information (“CHRI”) confidential. CHRI generated by the National Crime Information Center or by the Texas Crime Information Center is confidential under federal and state law. Title 28, part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs the release of CHRI states obtain from the federal government or other states. Open Records Decision No. 565 at 7 (1990). The federal regulations allow each state to follow its individual law with respect to CHRI it generates. *Id.* at 10-12. Section 411.083 of the Government Code deems confidential CHRI the Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) maintains, except DPS may disseminate this information as provided in chapter 411, subchapter F or subchapter E-1 of the Government Code. *See* Gov’t Code § 411.083(a). Sections 411.083(b)(1) and 411.089(a) of the Government Code authorize a criminal justice agency to obtain CHRI; however, a criminal justice agency may not release CHRI except to another criminal justice agency for criminal justice purposes. *See id.* § 411.089(b)(1). We note section 411.083 does not apply to active warrant information or other information relating to one’s current involvement in the criminal justice system. *See id.* § 411.081(b) (police department allowed to disclose information pertaining to person’s current involvement in the criminal justice system). Further, CHRI does not include driving record information. *See id.* § 411.082(2)(B). Upon review, we find the information the sheriff’s office has marked does not constitute confidential CHRI; thus, the sheriff’s office may not withhold it under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 411.083 of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. Under the common-law right of privacy, an individual has a right to be free from the publicizing of private affairs in which the public has no legitimate concern. *Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 682. In considering whether a public citizen’s date of birth is private, the Third Court of Appeals looked to the supreme court’s rationale in *Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas*, 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010). *Paxton v. City of Dallas*, No. 03-13-00546-CV, 2015 WL 3394061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The supreme court concluded public employees’ dates of birth are private under section 552.102 of the Government Code because the employees’ privacy interest substantially outweighed the negligible public interest in disclosure.² *Texas Comptroller*, 354 S.W.3d at 347-48. Based on *Texas Comptroller*, the court of appeals concluded the privacy rights of public employees apply

²Section 552.102(a) excepts from disclosure “information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Gov’t Code § 552.102(a).

equally to public citizens, and thus, public citizens' dates of birth are also protected by common-law privacy pursuant to section 552.101. *City of Dallas*, 2015 WL 3394061, at *3.

However, because "the right of privacy is purely personal," that right "terminates upon the death of the person whose privacy is invaded." *Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enters., Inc.*, 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *see also Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp.*, 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977))); Attorney General Opinions JM-229 (1984) ("the right of privacy lapses upon death"), H-917 (1976) ("We are . . . of the opinion that the Texas courts would follow the almost uniform rule of other jurisdictions that the right of privacy lapses upon death."); Open Records Decision No. 272 (1981) ("the right of privacy is personal and lapses upon death"). Thus, information pertaining solely to a deceased individual may not be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Upon review, we find the information we have marked and the dates of birth of living individuals who are identified satisfy the standard articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation*. Accordingly, the sheriff's office must withhold the information we have marked and the dates of birth of living individuals under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. However, the sheriff's office has failed to demonstrate the remaining information it has marked is highly intimate or embarrassing and of no legitimate public interest. Thus, the sheriff's office may not withhold the remaining information it has marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the informer's privilege, which has long been recognized by Texas courts. *See Aguilar v. State*, 444 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); *Hawthorne v. State*, 10 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1928). The informer's privilege protects from disclosure the identities of persons who report activities over which the governmental body has criminal or quasi-criminal law-enforcement authority, provided the subject of the information does not already know the informer's identity. *See* Open Records Decision No. 208 at 1-2 (1978). The informer's privilege protects the identities of individuals who report violations of statutes to the police or similar law-enforcement agencies, as well as those who report violations of statutes with civil or criminal penalties to "administrative officials having a duty of inspection or of law enforcement within their particular spheres." Open Records Decision No. 279 at 1-2 (1981) (citing 8 John H. Wigmore, *Evidence in Trials at Common Law*, § 2374, at 767 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)). The report must be of a violation of a criminal or civil statute. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 582 at 2 (1990), 515 at 4 (1988).

The sheriff's office states the information it has marked could identify informants. However, the sheriff's office does not inform us what criminal or civil statutes were reported to be violated in the information at issue. Therefore, we find the information at issue does not identify an informer for the purposes of the informer's privilege. Accordingly, the sheriff's

office may not withhold any of the information it has marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the common-law informer's privilege.

Section 552.130 of the Government Code provides information relating to a motor vehicle operator's or driver's license, motor vehicle title or registration, or personal identification document issued by an agency of this state or another state or country is excepted from public release. Gov't Code § 552.130(a). We note the purpose of section 552.130 is to protect the privacy interests of individuals. Some of the driver's license information pertains solely to deceased individuals. *See Moore*, 589 S.W.2d 489; *Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp.*, 472 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Attorney General Opinions JM-229, H-917; Open Records Decision No. 272. Because the right of privacy lapses at death, motor vehicle record information that pertains solely to a deceased individual may not be withheld under section 552.130. Upon review, we find the sheriff's office must withhold the motor vehicle record information we have marked under section 552.130 of the Government Code. However, the remaining information the sheriff's office has marked is not subject to section 552.130; thus, the sheriff's office may not withhold it.

In summary, the sheriff's office must withhold the information we have marked and the dates of birth of living individuals who are identified under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. The sheriff's office must withhold the motor vehicle record information we have marked under section 552.130 of the Government Code. The sheriff's office must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



David L. Wheelus
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

DLW/bhf

Ref: ID# 598954

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)